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THE LONG GOODBYE: AFTER THE
INNOCENCE MOVEMENT, DOES THE
ATTORNEY–CLIENT RELATIONSHIP EVER
END?
LARA A. BAZELON*
Inspired by the Innocence Movement, the American Bar Association
has placed an unprecedented new obligation on defense counsel in the form
of an “Innocence Standard.” This new rule imposes an affirmative “duty
to act” upon criminal defense attorneys who learn of newly discovered
evidence that a former client may be innocent.
The new Standard, while well-intentioned, reconceives the
traditional defense attorney function, creating an ethical parity between
prosecutors and defense attorneys in wrongful conviction cases while
overlooking the fact that the two sides play distinct and incompatible roles
in our adversarial system. While prosecutors must to seek the truth and
administer justice, defense counsel’s obligation is to zealously defend her
current client. The Innocence Standard has the unintended effect of
potentially destabilizing that primary and paramount relationship. It may
require counsel to place the interests of a former client above those of a
current client. It may expose counsel to allegations of ineffective assistance
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in the representation of the former client. And, perhaps most importantly,
it may require labor-intensive, complex work that will draw scarce
resources away from current clients because most defense attorneys are
already under-resourced and staggering under excessive caseloads.
In an ideal world, every defense attorney would embrace the work of
freeing a wrongfully convicted former client, but in the real world, is it
practicable to demand that they do so and fair to suggest that they are
unethical if they do not?
This Article—the first scholarship to discuss the Innocence Standard—
examines how the innocence movement’s influential emphasis on accuracy
may be eroding other important values and aims served by the adversarial
process. The Innocence Standard asks defense counsel to serve two
masters, her client and the truth. The creation of this dual obligation
conflicts with centuries of defense tradition and decades of well-established
doctrine.
The truth-seeking function has traditionally rested with
prosecutors, judges, and juries; defense counsel’s primary obligation has
always been to zealously represent her present-day client. Shifting the
truth-seeking burden onto defense counsel after her representation of a
client has ended threatens to erode the adversarial system, the historical
loyalties of defense counsel, and the meaning of zealous advocacy.
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INTRODUCTION
The impact of the Innocence Movement on the criminal justice system
has been profound, bringing into sharp relief gross injustices that previously
had been all too easy to downplay or ignore.1 Twice a week on average, an
innocent person is set free, often after spending decades in prison.2 These
exonerations are extensively covered by the media, searing into the national
consciousness powerful images of the prisoner’s emotional reaction at the
moment of freedom and an equally powerful narrative of the long road from
hopeless, unmitigated suffering to sudden and complete redemption.3
The Innocence Movement—the law school clinics, non-profit
organizations, religious institutions, and individual lawyers dedicated to the
work of overturning wrongful convictions—has challenged the
conventional wisdom underlying the basic tenets of our criminal justice

1

See Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano, Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L.
REV. 955, 977–78 (2013/2014) (“The increased ability to amplify its message to key
political decision-makers and instrumental organizations such as the American Bar
Association and state forensic science commissions [is an] indicator[] the innocence projects
and the Innocence Network are becoming more able to effect real change.”); NAT’L
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., EXONERATIONS IN 2014 1 (2015),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_report.p
df [hereinafter NAT’L REGISTRY, 2014 EXONERATIONS] (stating that there were 125
exonerations in the United States in 2014 and 1,535 exonerations in the United States from
1989 to January 20, 2015).
2
The Registry, “a project of the University of Michigan Law School, provides detailed
information about every known exoneration in the United States since 1989[.]” NAT’L
REGISTRY, 2014 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 12. The authors of the 2014 Report
“recorded 125 exonerations in 2014,” which averages about 2.4 each week. See id. at 1.
3
See, e.g., John Caniglia, Ricky Jackson and Wiley Bridgeman: Exonerated Friends
Leave Prison After 39 Years Behind Bars, CLEVELAND.COM (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.
cleveland.com/court-justice/index.ssf/2014/11/finally_exonerated_friends_lea.html; Nicole
Carr, 70-Year-Old Joseph Sledge Freed After Decades in Prison, ABC11 (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://abc11.com/news/70-year-old-joseph-sledge-freed-after-decades-in-prison/488063/;
Elahe Izadi, Ohio Man Exonerated After Spending 27 Years in Prison for a Murder He
Didn’t Commit, WASH. POST (Dec. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2014/12/09/ohio-man-exonerated-after-spending-27-years-in-prison-for-a-murder
-he-didnt-commit/; Michael McLaughlin, Alstory Simon Talks About Life After Wrongful
Conviction, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2014/11/17/alstory-simon_n_6155658.html; Ashley Powers, Witness’ Sister Helps Free Man
Convicted in 1979 Killing, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/
2013/nov/07/local/la-me-innocence-hearing-20131108.
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system.4 Exoneration after exoneration reveals bleak truths: that
eyewitnesses who were one-hundred percent certain are often one-hundred
percent wrong,5 that defendants who confess may be innocent,6 that police
4

See Richard A. Leo & Jon B. Gould, Studying Wrongful Convictions: Learning From
Social Science, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 7, 9 (2009) (“[T]here are now almost fifty non-profit
innocence projects [connected to the Innocence Movement] whose purpose is to investigate
and litigate post-conviction claims of innocence as well as to propose reforms.”); Daniel S.
Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549, 1549 (2008) (“American criminal law is
undergoing a transformation due to the increasing centrality of issues related to actual
innocence in courtrooms, classrooms, and newsrooms.”); Andrew E. Taslitz, Sentencing
Lessons From the Innocence Movement, 21 CRIM. JUST. 6, 6–9, 13, 15 (2006) (discussing the
myriad of ways in which the Innocence Movement has impacted the criminal justice
system).
Centurion Ministries—founded by Jim McCloskey, then a theology student at Princeton,
because of his “personal spiritual calling”—has been advocating for the wrongfully
convicted since 1980. 1980–1989: How and Why It Was Created, CENTURION MINISTRIES,
http://centurionministries.org/about-us/at-a-glance/. Its name comes from the words uttered
by a Roman Centurion stationed at the Cross, who looked up at the body of Jesus Christ and
said, “Surely this one is innocent.” Frequently Asked Questions, CENTURION MINISTRIES,
http://centurionministries.org/faq/. For other examples of religious organization involvement
in the Innocence Movement, see Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real World of
Racial Injustice in the Criminal Law System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 871
(2003).
5
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, UNIV. OF MICH. LAW SCH., THE FIRST 1600
EXONERATIONS 11 (2015), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600
_Exonerations.pdf [hereinafter NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS] (noting that thirtyfour percent of wrongful convictions from 1989 to May 18, 2015 involved mistaken
eyewitness identification; however, in exonerations regarding rape convictions, mistaken
eyewitness identification played a role seventy-two percent of the time); see also Seth F.
Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: Factual Innocence and
Postconviction DNA Testing, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 563 (2002).
6
NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that thirteen percent
of all wrongful convictions from 1989 to May 18, 2015 involved false confessions). The
Central Park Five documentary, released in 2012, explores in-depth perhaps the most famous
false confession case in recent memory. CENTRAL PARK FIVE (PBS Distribution 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/kenburns/centralparkfive. Following the rape of the woman who became
nationally known as “the Central Park jogger,” the New York City Police Department
arrested five teenagers—four black and one Hispanic—and interrogated them for hours
without access to counsel and, in some cases, their parents. Cookie Ridolfi & Marjorie K.
Allard, Book Review, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1485, 1491 (2003) (reviewing GISLI H.
GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A HANDBOOK
(2003)). The five young men confessed and were later tried, convicted, and imprisoned for
the brutal attack on the victim. Id. Years later, when DNA recovered from the jogger’s
clothing matched a known rapist who confessed to the crimes, the four men, now in their
thirties, were freed. Benjamin Weiser, 5 Exonerated in Central Park Jogger Case Agree to
Settle Suit for $40 Million, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
06/20/nyregion/5-exonerated-in-central-park-jogger-case-are-to-settle-suit-for-40-million.
html?_r=0.

2. BAZELON 3.12.17

2016]

3/12/2017 4:53 PM

LARA A. BAZELON

685

and prosecutors sometimes fail to play by the rules,7 that defense attorneys
sometimes fall down on the job,8 and that, as a result, jurors reach the
wrong conclusions. Between 1989 and 2015, more than 1,600 men and
women were exonerated following years—often decades—of imprisonment
for wrongful convictions.9 And those are just the documented cases. In all
likelihood, there are many more.10
It is not possible to absorb these facts without second-guessing the
accuracy and fairness of the justice meted out in courtrooms across the
United States. Gross miscarriages of justice occur, and they occur with
some frequency.11 Because of the Innocence Movement, the frequency of
wrongful convictions is now public knowledge,12 and important reforms
7
NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that forty-five
percent of exonerations from 1989 to May 18, 2015 involved official misconduct). This
number includes the case of Michael Morton, an innocent man who spent twenty-five years
in prison for the murder of his wife due in large part to gross misconduct by prosecutor Ken
Anderson. See Pamela Colloff, The Guilty Man, TEX. MONTHLY (June 2013),
http://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/the-guilty-man/. Anderson, who went on to
become a judge, was eventually indicted and convicted for his misconduct in the Morton
case, and disbarred. Heather Saul, Texas Prosecutor Ken Anderson Jailed for Convicting
Innocent Michael Morton, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 9, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/texas-prosecutor-ken-anderson-jailed-for-convicting-innocent-michael
-morton-8930428.html; Press Release, Innocence Project, Former Williamson County
Prosecutor Ken Anderson Enters Plea to Contempt for Misconduct in Michael Mortonâ€™s
[sic] Wrongful Murder Conviction (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.innocenceproject.org/formerwilliamson-county-prosecutor-ken-anderson-enters-plea-to-contempt-for-misconduct-inmichael-mortonaes-wrongful-murder-conviction/.
8
Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 859–60 (2004); see also Inadequate Defense,
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/in
adequate-defense (last visited Oct. 10, 2015).
9
NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 4.
10
There is no way to know with any certainty how many wrongfully convicted men and
women remain in prison today, but most scholars who study the issue believe that the known
exonerees are only “the tip of the iceberg,” freed through a combination of luck, persistence,
good lawyering, and often DNA or forensic evidence. See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal
Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV.
125, 131 (2004).
11
Tim Bakken, Models of Justice to Protect Innocent Persons, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV.
837, 841–42 (2011/2012). According to the DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Statistics on wrongful
convictions, which assumes an error rate of one percent, there were 72,000 wrongfully
convicted people in the United States as of 2009. Id. at 843.
12
See Medwed, supra note 4, at 1549–52; Benjamin C. Eggert & Ashley Eiler, Trigger
of Insurance Coverage For Wrongful Arrest, Prosecution and Conviction Lawsuits, 22
COVERAGE 50 (2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insurance/articles/
janfeb2012-trigger-of-insurance.html (“By some estimates, the rate of exonerations has been

2. BAZELON 3.12.17

686

3/12/2017 4:53 PM

AFTER THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT

[Vol. 106

designed to make the number vanishingly rare have been enacted.13 Many
are heralded and relatively non-controversial, such as the passage of laws
designed to ease the burden on inmates seeking DNA testing,14 the decision
by some police departments to reform the way that line-ups and photo
spread identifications are conducted to ensure greater accuracy,15 and the
establishment of post-conviction integrity units within prosecutors’ offices

rapidly increasing[.]”); Alan Berlow, What Happened in Norfolk?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug.
19, 2007, at 36 (“[P]roclamations of innocence are no longer surprising.”); Douglas A.
Blackmon, Louisiana Death-row Inmate Damon Thibodeaux Exonerated with DNA
Evidence, WASH. POST (Sept. 28, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
louisiana-death-row-inmate-damon-thibodeaux-is-exonerated-with-dna-evidence/2012/09/
28/26e30012-0997-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_story.html; Peter Dujardin, A Closer Look at
Lineups, DAILY PRESS (Feb. 6, 2010), http://articles.dailypress.com/2010-02-06/news/10020
50086_1_wrongful-convictions-innocence-project-arthur-lee-whitfield (discussing need to
“revamp” lineups due to the increased numbers of exonerations involving eyewitness
misidentification).
13
Fourteen states have adopted eyewitness identification reforms urged by the Innocence
Project and the National Institute of Justice. See Eyewitness Misidentification, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://innocenceproject.org/causes-wrongful-conviction/eyewitness-misidentification
(last visited Oct. 10, 2015); see also discussion of conviction integrity units, infra note 16.
14
The First 250 DNA Exonerations: Transforming the Criminal Justice System,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/the-first-250-dna-exonerationsINNOCENCE PROJECT,
transforming-the-criminal-justice-system/ (last visited June 24, 2016) (“47 states currently
provide statutory access to post-conviction DNA testing (Alaska, Massachusetts &
Oklahoma do not).”). In 1992, Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld founded the Innocence
Project at the Cardozo School of Law. Our Work, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.
innocenceproject.org/about/ (last visited June 24, 2016). The Innocence Project is dedicated
to helping convicted prisoners prove their innocence through DNA testing. Id. Scheck and
Neufeld’s Innocence Project, which inspired the creation of numerous other Innocence
Projects in other states, maintains a website that provides details about the causes of
wrongful convictions, the personal stories of exonerees, and the legislation pending or
enacted to bring reform to the criminal justice system. See id. According to the Innocence
Project’s website, more than 340 people in the United States have been exonerated by DNA
testing, “including 20 who served time on death row.” Exonerate the Innocent, INNOCENCE
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/exonerate/ (last visited June 24, 2016).
15
See Eyewitness Misidentification, supra note 13. Fourteen states have adopted
eyewitness identification reforms urged by the Innocence Project and the National Institute
of Justice, including: the blind administration of a photo or live line-up so that the officer in
charge does not know the identity of the suspect; filler photographs that more closely
resemble the suspect; specific instructions to the witness that the perpetrator may not be in
the line-up or photo array and the investigation will go forward regardless of whether the
witness picks someone; asking the witness to provide a written statement of his or her level
of confidence in the identification; recording all of the identification procedures; and
sequential presentation of the members of a line-up or the photographs in a photo array so
that the witness views them one by one and has no opportunity to make a relative
comparison (i.e., that person looks the most like the suspect out of all the options). Id.
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to reexamine old cases in which there is some doubt about a defendant’s
guilt.16
There is a new reform, also propelled by the Innocence Movement,
about which little is known, and which may have complex, real-world
repercussions that have yet to be fully explored: the addition of an
“Innocence Standard” to the American Bar Association’s code of ethics for
criminal defense attorneys.17
The code, known as the Defense Function Standards, exhorts defense
attorneys to abide by the highest ethical standards in the defense of their
clients.18 While the American Bar Association’s Defense Function

16

NAT’L REGISTRY, 2014 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 1. There has been a rise in
Conviction Integrity Units (CIUs), with 15 CIUs in 2014 compared to 9 in 2013, 7 in 2012,
and 5 in 2011. See id. at 6. CIUs are “long-term operations” run by prosecutors “that work to
prevent, to identify and to remedy false convictions.” Id.; see also Barry Scheck,
Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why We Need Them, Why They Will Work,
and Models For Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2215, 2217–18 (2010); Keith Swisher,
Prosecutorial Conflicts of Interest In Post-Conviction Practice, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 181,
212 n.113 (2012); Zalman & Carrano, supra note 1, at 975.
17
AM. BAR ASS’N, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE
GUILTY, REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMMITTEE
TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna S. Raeder
eds., 2006), reprinted in 37 SW. U. L. REV. 763, 766 (2008) (explaining that the rising tide of
exonerations prompted the ABA to form an Ad Hoc Innocence Committee in 2002 to
propose reforms to ensure the integrity of the criminal justice system) [hereinafter
ACHIEVING JUSTICE]. This committee passed nine resolutions, id. at 774, and much of the
committee’s work is reflected in the revised Prosecution and Defense Function Standards.
The Standards for Prosecution and Defense Functions, first published in 1979, are built on
the ethical obligations specific to criminal lawyers in the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4–1.1(b) (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter DEFENSE STANDARDS], http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition-Tableof
Contents.html (“For purposes of consistency, these Standards sometimes include language
taken from the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; but the Standards often address
conduct or provide details beyond that governed by the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.”); AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
§ 3–1.1(b) (4th ed. 2015) [hereinafter PROSECUTION STANDARDS], http://www.americanbar.
org/groups/criminaljustice/standards/ProsecutionFunctionFourthEdition-TableofContents.
html. The Fourth Edition of the Standard was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in
February 2015. See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra, Table of Contents; PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra, Table of Contents. For a discussion of how the standards were revised,
see Rory K. Little, The ABA’s Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the
Prosecution and Defense Functions, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1112–18 (2011) (describing the
“challenging and professionally absorbing” process of editing the Criminal Justice Standards
for Prosecution and Defense Functions, which have not been revised since 1991).
18
See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.1 (noting that while the Standards are

2. BAZELON 3.12.17

688

3/12/2017 4:53 PM

AFTER THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT

[Vol. 106

Standards lack the force of law, their influence on ethical norms,
jurisprudence, and legislation is readily apparent: they have been adopted
by the vast majority of states and cited hundreds of times by the United
States Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts.19
The new Innocence Standard, formally adopted in February of 2015,
imposes an affirmative obligation on defense counsel “to act” upon learning
of evidence that creates a “reasonable likelihood” that a former client may
have been “wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent.”20
“aspirational,” and descriptive of “best practices,” rather than having the force of law,
“[t]hey may be relevant in judicial evaluation of constitutional claims regarding the right to
counsel,” and are “intended to address the performance of criminal defense counsel in all
stages of their professional work”).
19
Martin Marcus, The Making of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards: Forty Years of
Excellence, 23 CRIM. JUST. 10, 11–12 (2009). By May 1979, five years after the Standards
were first fully published in 1974, thirty-six states had revised their criminal codes to
incorporate all or part of them. Id. In two landmark cases, the United States Supreme Court
singled out the Criminal Defense Standards as a helpful reference point in developing and
interpreting the law relating to assessing a trial attorney’s fulfillment of the Sixth
Amendment obligation to provide the effective assistance of counsel. See Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010) (“Although they are ‘only guides,’ . . . and not
‘inexorable commands,’ . . . these [ABA Criminal Justice] standards may be valuable
measures of the prevailing professional norms of effective representation.”); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (noting that the Standards set forth “[p]revailing
norms of practice” that act as “guides to determining what is reasonable”). As Professor
Bruce Green has pointed out:
[E]ven if enforceable law does not dictate how prosecutors should exercise charging discretion
in a particular situation or whether defense lawyers should advise clients about confidentiality
obligations and associated exceptions, there is a value to developing and articulating standards
governing this conduct if a professional consensus can be achieved. In that event, lawyers might
be subject to public or professional opprobrium for departing from the professional standards.

Bruce A. Green, Developing Standards of Conduct for Prosecutors and Criminal Defense
Lawyers, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1093, 1097 (2011).
20
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. There is spirited debate about what
“innocence” means as a legal concept. Some people distinguish between legal (or “actual”)
and factual innocence with the idea that those falling into the former category are exonerated
based on constitutional or other rights violations while those falling into the latter category
are factually innocent in that they did not commit the charged crime. See Cathleen Burnett,
Constructions of Innocence, 70 UMKC L. REV. 971, 975–80 (2002); cf. William S. Laufer,
The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 331 n.4 (1995) (arguing that legal, actual,
and factual innocence are “three conceptually distinct determinations of innocence”);
Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 456 (2001)
(discussing “burden of proof,” factual, and legal innocence). These distinctions, however,
obscure the fact that most exonerees, factually innocent or otherwise, are freed because of
legal errors, as innocence is rarely recognized as a freestanding claim. See Lara Bazelon,
Scalia’s Embarrassing Question, SLATE (Mar. 11, 2015, 9:37 a.m.), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2015/03/innocence_is_not_cause_for_ex
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In so doing, it offers a vision of what it means to be a criminal defense
lawyer that is a stark departure from traditional practice. In this new
paradigm, defense counsel is an advocate with an ethical obligation to the
truth, whose ongoing responsibilities to uncover and present that truth have
no clear boundaries or end point.21 While the Innocence Standard has the
laudable aim of exposing and correcting wrongful convictions, it also has
the potential to create an ethical thicket for counsel, destabilizing the
relationship between counsel and her current clients while imposing a
heavy burden on an already understaffed and overworked defense bar.
The Innocence Standard mirrors the ethical obligations already
imposed on prosecutors,22 establishing parity between the two sides in this
realm. Yet, prosecutors and defense attorneys play fundamentally different
roles in our adversarial system. Prosecutors are ministers of justice who
serve the truth at all costs, even if it means undermining an ongoing
prosecution or seeking to vacate an old conviction. Defense counsel, on the
other hand, must do everything possible within the bounds of the law to
zealously represent their current clients, with no obligation to the truth or
any duty to act affirmatively on behalf of someone they no longer represent.
By expanding defense counsel’s obligations to bring them more in line with
those of prosecutors, the Innocence Standard may have blurred a line that
should be drawn plainly in the sand.
Part I of this Article sets forth the parameters of the criminal defense
attorney–client relationship as it has been traditionally defined, and
discusses the ways the new Innocence Standard alters that definition. Part II
discusses the historical and moral justifications for enacting this change: the
emergence of the Innocence Movement, the steady flow of exonerations
oneration_scalia_s_embarrassing_question_is.html. In other words, the categorization is
misleading in that it implies there is no overlap when the overlap is practically speaking,
almost complete. As Keith Findley, the former director of the Wisconsin Innocence Project,
has argued: “[T]hese distinctions are largely meaningless in our system of justice . . . there is
really only one functional category of ‘innocence,’ although how innocence is determined
can vary depending on context.” Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV.
1157, 1160 (2010/2011). Newly proposed Standard 4–9.4 adheres to Professor Findley’s
standard by requiring “some duty to act,” for ethical purposes, whenever counsel discovers
factual or legal evidence pointing to a “reasonable likelihood that a . . . former client was
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or [] actually innocent[.]” DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra
note 17, § 4–9.4.
21
See Raymond, supra note 20, at 450–51 (2001) (“[W]e need to consider the
consequences of the innocence movement for the ones left behind: the lawyers, defendants,
and jurors trying to secure just outcomes in criminal cases.”).
22
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT [hereinafter MODEL RULES] R. 3.8(g)–(h)
(1983).
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that point unambiguously to the gross failure of the system to fulfill its
“truth-seeking” function, and a recognition, among many prominent
practitioners of criminal defense, that a holistic model of representation is
crucial to effective representation.
Part III argues that the Innocence Standard, while undeniably wellintentioned, unfortunately fails to address the ethical implications of its
“duty to act” imperative. Left unaddressed are three major potential
conflicts for counsel. First, how to “act” if the newly discovered
information pointing to a former client’s innocence may cause harm to a
current client, second, how to “act” if the newly discovered evidence went
undiscovered due to counsel’s own failings during the representation of the
former client, and third, how to “act” in the ways the Standard demands
while carrying an excessive caseload that makes the competent
representation of current clients nearly impossible.
Part IV proposes revisions to the Innocence Standard that address the
ethical and practical dilemmas it implicitly raises while acknowledging that
these suggestions do not provide a conclusive resolution to the question it
poses: can defense counsel serve two masters, her current client and the
truth? In this Article, I argue that the answer to that question is no. The
Standard must be rewritten to make clear that a “duty to act” on behalf of a
former, possibly innocent client is ethical and practicable only when it is
consistent with defense counsel’s centuries-long established role in the
criminal justice system. The truth-seeking function rests with the prosecutor
and the court. Placing the same burden upon defense counsel without
limitations or precise definitions creates a false equivalency and endorses a
model of practice that could threaten to erode the adversarial system,
which, however imperfect, is what we rely upon to see that justice is done.
I. THE NEW INNOCENCE STANDARD AND ITS RECONCEPTION OF THE
ATTORNEY–CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
This section sets forth the parameters of the attorney–client
relationship in the American criminal justice system as it has been
understood for centuries, then explains the ways in which the ABA’s new
Innocence Standard would fundamentally alter those parameters.
A. ESTABLISHED LEGAL AND ETHICAL PARAMETERS GOVERNING
THE ATTORNEY–CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IN CRIMINAL CASES

The parameters of the attorney–client relationship in criminal cases are

2. BAZELON 3.12.17

2016]

3/12/2017 4:53 PM

LARA A. BAZELON

691

set forth in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, which guarantee the accused the rights to due process,
counsel, and equal protection of the laws respectively.23 The Supreme Court
has interpreted these rights to mean that any person accused of a felony or a
misdemeanor that can result in jail time, a suspended sentence, or probation
is entitled to have the effective assistance of counsel24 at all “critical
stage[s] of the [criminal] prosecution” after the filing of formal charges.25
The guarantee of competent legal representation at trial continues
through the disposition of the criminal case, whether by trial or plea.26
Counsel is also guaranteed on direct appeal if the defendant is convicted.27
Many defendants, rich and poor, have different attorneys at the trial and
appellate stages, creating two separate, clearly demarcated attorney–client

23

U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86 (1984). The Court has held that the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to “effective” counsel, defined as a lawyer
whose performance falls within “an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured by
“prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. Reviewing courts must approach every case with
the “strong presumption” that counsel’s performance was effective. Id. at 689. To prove
otherwise, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the
defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance; that is, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, there was a reasonable probability of a different result. Id. at 700.
25
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972) (plurality opinion) (quoting Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1967)); see also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9
(1970) (plurality opinion) (holding that a criminal defendant has the right to counsel at
preliminary hearings); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236–37 (1967) (holding that a
criminal defendant has the right to counsel at a pretrial line-up); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (holding that a criminal defendant has the right to counsel at postindictment interrogations); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1961) (holding that a
criminal has the right to counsel at arraignment).
26
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (noting precedent recognizes a right to
counsel during plea-bargaining process); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407–08 (2012)
(holding same); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (holding that a state must, at
trial, provide counsel to indigent defendants facing a term of imprisonment); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (same); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(“[L]awyers in criminal courts are necessities, not luxuries.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 58 (1932).
27
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1963). The right to counsel on appeal is
a Fifth Amendment right, not a Sixth Amendment right. See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,
396 (1985) (“A first appeal as of right therefore is not adjudicated in accord with due process
of law if the appellant does not have the effective assistance of an attorney.”). For a thorough
discussion of the Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence from Powell v. Alabama
through Strickland v. Washington, see, generally, Vivian O. Berger, The Supreme Court and
Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths—A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 13–28
(1986).
24
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relationships.28 In non-capital cases, the conclusion of the direct appeal
marks the end of the attorney–appellate client relationship for constitutional
purposes.29 Of course, wealthy defendants in all likelihood will retain
counsel for further appeals and habeas proceedings. And, a small fraction of
indigent, non-capital defendants are fortunate enough to obtain a courtappointed attorney on habeas because the reviewing judge believes that
counsel is necessary.30
Except for the select group of criminal defendants who can afford
habeas counsel or are entitled to it because they were sentenced to death,
the attorney–client relationship ends with the termination of the criminal
case at the trial or appellate level.31 The defendant’s file is closed and sent
to storage, and defense counsel files no further pleadings, makes no further
court appearances, and collects no further fees—either from the client or the
court. Traditionally and for all practical purposes, the formal, advocacydriven relationship is over. Once counsel ceases to act as the defendant’s
legal representative in that defendant’s criminal case, she becomes “former
counsel,” whose client is now a “former client.”
The end of the attorney–client relationship has always been less
circumscribed when viewed from an ethical, rather than a constitutional or
28

See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 356.
RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 12.2 (6th ed. 2011) (“[A]ppointed counsel is mandatory for all indigent
capital prisoners and becomes available even before they file federal habeas corpus petitions
when, as normally is the case, they need appointed counsel to assist them in investigating
and presenting claims in their petitions. In other cases, however, indigent (i.e., nearly all)
federal habeas corpus petitioners commence the proceedings either without legal assistance
or with only the aid of a fellow inmate or a volunteer attorney who may be unable to proceed
with the case in the absence of reimbursement for costs and time spent on the case.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 855–56 (1994).
30
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(h) (2012) (“[I]n all [habeas] proceedings brought under this
section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the court may appoint counsel for an
applicant who is or becomes financially unable to afford counsel, except as provided by a
rule promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.”); see also id. R.
8(c). (“If an evidentiary hearing is warranted, the judge must appoint an attorney to represent
a petitioner who qualifies to have counsel appointed under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A [adequate
representation of defendants]. The judge must conduct the hearing as soon as practicable
after giving the attorneys adequate time to investigate and prepare.”).
31
See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, §§ 4–8.1, 4–9.1, 4–9.2, 4–9.5. For trial
counsel, the case terminates after the client has been sentenced, any necessary post-trial
motions have been filed and litigated, and counsel has filed a notice of appeal. See id. §§ 4–
8.1(b), 4–9.1(b), (c). For appellate counsel, representation generally continues “through all
stages of a direct appeal, including review in the United States Supreme Court.” Id. § 4–
9.2(h); see also id. § 4–9.5(a).
29
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action-driven, perspective. The duties of loyalty and confidentiality, for
example, have long been understood to outlast not simply the life of the
case, but the life of the client and the attorney.32 But other than the rote
obligations to file a notice of appeal and return the client’s files and
property, counsel’s post-case duties are passive, fulfilled by simply saying
and doing nothing.33
B. THE NEW INNOCENCE STANDARD

The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted the
Innocence Standard, which is formally known as Defense Function
Standard 4-9.4, in February of 2015.34 The new standard tasks defense
counsel with an ethical obligation without precedent or constitutional
mooring: to affirmatively act to safeguard the rights of a former client in
any criminal case—even if that case had been closed for years, if not
decades earlier.35
The full text of the ABA’s Innocence Standard states:
(a) When defense counsel becomes aware of credible and material evidence or law
creating a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was wrongfully
convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent, counsel has some duty to act. This
duty applies even after counsel’s representation is ended. Counsel must consider, and
act in accordance with, duties of confidentiality. If such a former client currently has
counsel, former counsel may discharge the duty by alerting the client’s current
counsel.
(b) If such newly discovered evidence or law (whether due to a change in the law or
not) relevant to the validity of the client’s conviction or sentence, or evidence or law
tending to show actual innocence of the client, comes to the attention of the client’s
current defense counsel at any time after conviction, counsel should promptly:
(i) evaluate the information, investigate if necessary, and determine what potential
remedies are available;
(ii) advise and consult with the client; and
(iii) determine what action if any to take.
(c) Counsel should determine applicable deadlines for the effective use of such
evidence or law, including federal habeas corpus deadlines, and timely act to preserve
32

Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998).
See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.9 cmt. 1 (clarifying that the duty of
confidentiality outlasts the representation); id. at R. 1.9(c)(2) (explaining the duty to avoid
conflicts of interest between current and former clients by not revealing information relating
to a former client’s representation “except as these Rules would permit or require”).
34
See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, Table of Contents.
35
Id. § 4–9.4(a).
33
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the client’s rights. Counsel should determine whether—and if so, how best—to notify
36
the prosecution and court of such evidence.

C. IMPACT OF THE INNOCENCE STANDARD

The Innocence Standard states that defense counsel has “some duty to
act” upon learning “of credible and material evidence or law [which]
create[s] a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent . . . . This duty
applies even after counsel’s representation is ended.”37 The final paragraph
instructs counsel or former counsel to learn of any statutes of limitations
that might limit the use of the evidence in a post-conviction proceeding and
to act to ensure that the deadline does not run before the evidence is brought
forward. The Standard also instructs present and former counsel to consider
the pros and cons of informing the court and the prosecution.38 The rule is
written broadly to apply to any kind of criminal case: felony or
misdemeanor, capital or noncapital.
The Innocence Standard’s imperative that a defense attorney “act” on
behalf of a former client in these complex and potentially labor-intensive
ways is unprecedented. Nowhere else in the American Bar Association’s
Defense Function Standards or the American Bar Association’s Model
Code of Professional Conduct is counsel required to do anything on behalf
of a former client, other than the rote tasks of filing a notice of appeal,
returning the client’s property, and providing the case file to the client and

36
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. As it applies to a current client, the
obligations imposed by the new Standard are utterly consistent with defense counsel’s preexisting duty of zealous representation. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
Indeed, one could argue that there is no need to spell out explicitly what is implicit, that a
competent attorney, upon learning of a current client’s possible innocence, would investigate
the evidence, advise the client, and determine from there what appropriate actions to take.
See id. R. 1.1 cmt. 5. And, at first read, the Innocence Standard’s “duty to act” as applied to
a former client also seems eminently reasonable, even obvious: why would trial counsel not
do everything in her power to advocate on behalf of a former client if she learns of new
evidence pointing to that client’s innocence or wrongful conviction? See DEFENSE
STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. The Innocence Movement has proven that wrongful
convictions are a serious problem; making defense counsel part of the solution is one more
means of solving it. The ABA can also rightly point to precedent for the new Innocence
Standard it has applied to prosecutors since 2008. See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R.
3.8(g)–(h).
37
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a) (emphasis added).
38
See id. § 4–9.4(c) (“Counsel should determine whether—and if so, how best—to
notify the prosecution and court of such evidence.”).
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successor counsel, if requested.39 Counsel fulfills her unending duty of
confidentiality with the ultimate non-action: remaining silent.
But the Innocence Standard demands more than passivity if new
evidence emerges indicating the wrongful conviction of a former client.
While the Standard says the duty to act can be discharged by informing the
former client’s current counsel, that exit ramp will rarely be available
because the vast majority of post-appeal convicted inmates have no
counsel.40 And although the Standard does not elaborate on what “some
duty to act” might involve, if the imperative is exoneration, it logically
follows that it would include the same actions the Standard mandates for
current counsel: “evaluate,” “investigate,” and “advise and consult with the
[former] client.”41
More specifically, the Innocence Standard obligates both current and
former counsel to “determine applicable deadlines for the effective use of
such evidence or law, including federal habeas corpus deadlines, and [to]
timely act to preserve the client’s rights.”42 This undertaking is complex
and fraught. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), which governs the litigation of federal habeas petitions, imposes
a stringent statute of limitations on prisoners seeking to challenge their
convictions through the vehicle of federal habeas.43
39

Id. §§ 4–3.11(c), 4–9.1(c). The ABA’s Rules of Professional Conduct, which apply to
civil and criminal lawyers alike and which have been adopted by the majority of
jurisdictions in the United States, also make no mention of any affirmative duty to act by
defense counsel on behalf of a former client, other than the duty to return the client’s papers
and property. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.16(d); see Jenna C. Newmark, Note, The
Lawyer’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma”: Duty and Self-Defense in Postconviction Ineffectiveness
Claims, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 699, 708–20 (2010) (delineating a lawyer’s ethical obligation
to former clients as the duty of confidentiality and the duty to provide information). The
same holds true for the American Law Institute’s Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. See id.
40
See Wayne E. Brucar, Post-Conviction Petition Practice: How to Write a Successful
Petition and Get Your Client a Hearing, 26 DCBA BRIEF 22, 23 (2014) (“There is no
constitutional right to counsel in Post-Conviction proceedings.”), http://www.dcba.org/
resource/resmgr/Brief_pdf/BRIEF_Mar2014.pdf; Edward A. Tomlinson, Post-Conviction in
Maryland: Past, Present, and Future, 45 MD. L. REV. 927, 958 (1986) (“[T]here is no federal
or state constitutional right to counsel at a post-conviction proceeding [in noncapital
cases].”).
41
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(b).
42
Id. § 4–9.4(c).
43
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf
of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the
adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

2. BAZELON 3.12.17

696

3/12/2017 4:53 PM

AFTER THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT

[Vol. 106

The habeas deadline gives rise to a number of challenges that inmates
must confront, which include complying with tight filing deadlines and
exhausting all federal claims in state court before seeking habeas
protection. Satisfying these obligations requires careful strategic thinking
and the preparation of complex written pleadings. Compounding that
challenge is the fact that non-capital prisoners seeking habeas relief have no
right to counsel, and thus must represent themselves in all AEDPA-related
proceedings unless they can afford an attorney.44 The vast majority,
however, are indigent and therefore unrepresented.45 Compliance with the
Innocence Standard, therefore, seems to task former counsel with
explaining AEDPA’s complexities to the former client.
Compliance may require significant self-education for prior counsel.
Most state court practitioners have no reason to be familiar with AEDPA,
which demands that an inmate file a federal habeas petition no later than
one year and ninety days from the date the highest state court denied the
direct appeal, or one year from the date that the United States Supreme
Court denies certiorari.46 This deadline may be relatively easy to calculate
and apply, and for many former clients, it will have long passed by the time
the new evidence surfaces.47 But the blown deadline does not discharge
counsel of her responsibilities of the Standard, because it may be overcome
by what is known as the “innocence gateway,” an exception that allows a
defendant to present an untimely federal claim if it turns on evidence of
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.”); see also Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The
Challenge of Postconviction Discovery, Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV.
545, 549 n.16 (2014) (“In practice, [AEDPA] created a mountain of significant procedural
hurdles to inmates seeking habeas relief.”).
44
See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“[T]he right to appointed
counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”).
45
See Lee Kovarsky, Original Habeas Redux, 97 VA. L. REV. 61, 88–89 (2011) (“Of the
criminally confined prisoners attacking capital sentences, almost ninety-five percent were
represented by counsel. By contrast, only about two percent of criminally confined,
noncapital prisoners had lawyers.”).
46
Levenson, supra note 43. Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Elizabeth Cateforis, Federal
Habeas Corpus For Trial Lawyers, J. KAN. B.A., Jan. 2004, at 20, 22 (“There are four
distinct starting points for calculating the deadline, depending on four different
circumstances. The common starting point for most state inmates is ‘the date on which the
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review.’ This time period includes time the case spends on direct appeal, on
petition for review before the state supreme court, and the 90 days allowed for the filing of a
certiorari petition even if the petition is not filed.” (footnote omitted)).
47
Any inmate who fails to file within AEDPA’s statute of limitations is considered timebarred, absent an exception. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013).
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actual innocence.48 To comply with the Innocence Standard, defense
counsel seems tasked with advising former clients of the innocence gateway
exception and explaining how most effectively to litigate pro se so that their
untimely claims have a chance of receiving due consideration. Ideally, the
previous counsel would also advise former clients to file a request for the
appointment of new counsel. Because that motion is so crucial, the previous
counsel should also consider helping former clients with the drafting of the
motion so that it has a better chance of success.
For the select group of former clients within AEDPA’s statute of
limitations, the duty to “timely act to preserve the client’s rights” will
involve an even more complicated series of explanations. AEDPA demands
that the timely filed federal petition be: (a) comprehensive—include every
cognizable federal constitutional claim49—and, (b) exhausted—contain only
claims that have been previously evaluated on their merits by the state
courts.50 So-called successive claims—that is, claims in petitions brought
after the first petition—are almost certain to be denied as untimely.51 And
unexhausted claims are generally dismissed outright.52

48

See id. The Supreme Court has never held that a freestanding claim of actual
innocence may serve as the basis for federal habeas relief. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
400–01 (1993) (“Few rulings would be more disruptive of our federal system than to provide
for federal habeas review of freestanding claims of actual innocence.”). Recently, however,
the Court held that, “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a
petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar . . . or . . . expiration of the
statute of limitations.” McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928.
49
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 29, § 11.3[b] (“[AEDPA] created a number of new
procedural defenses and expanded others that already existed. As a result, prisoners have
even more reason than before to discover and include in their initial federal habeas corpus
petitions every ‘colorable ground[] for relief[.]’” (footnotes omitted)); see 28 U.S.C. §§
2244(b)(2)–(3), 2255(h) (2012) (barring any second or successive habeas petition unless it
cites new rules of constitutional law with retroactive effect as its basis, or the factual
predicate giving rise to the constitutional claim could not have been discovered at the time
with due diligence); see also Gage v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 2015).
50
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)–(c) (2012); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982)
(holding that § 2254 requires a district court to dismiss any habeas petition with unexhausted
state court claims); Dickens v. Ryan, 740 F.3d 1302, 1317 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (“A
federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner unless he has properly exhausted
his remedies in state court.” (quoting Peterson v. Lampert, 319 F.3d 1153, 1155 (9th Cir.
2003) (en banc)).
51
See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 29, § 28.3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1); see, e.g.,
Gage, 793 F.3d at 1165–66.
52
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 29, § 23.1; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); see, e.g.,
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275–76 (1971); Arrendondo v. Neven, 763 F.3d 1122, 1138
(9th Cir. 2014).
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For these reasons, it is important for the former client to file every
viable federal constitutional claim in a single petition. But at least one of
those claims will not be exhausted: a claim that involves newly discovered
evidence unavailable to the prisoner at an earlier date, which points to his or
her innocence or wrongful conviction.53 If a former client has, in addition to
the innocence claim, at least one other claim that the state courts have
previously reviewed (and rejected), he or she will have a “mixed petition,”
which contains some claims that are exhausted and some claims that are
not.54 Therefore, counsel must also advise the former client to seek a stay
from the federal district court to go back to state court and exhaust the
unexhausted claim or claims. Competently advising the former client
involves familiarity with the stay-and-abey doctrine, and the ability to
explain to the client how to litigate, pro se, to obtain a stay-and-abey
order.55 Once again, counsel should also advise the client to file a motion
for the appointment of counsel and help the client with the drafting of the

53

McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. Evidence of actual innocence is often newly
discovered not because it is “new,” per se, but because it was withheld due to misconduct by
the prosecution or police, false testimony by witnesses, or ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, all of which are constitutionally viable grounds for habeas relief. See Bazelon,
supra note 20. Thus, evidence of actual innocence is often presented to federal courts
through one of these vehicles. Id. The obvious conflict presented by former counsel advising
a former client to present an actual innocence claim by arguing that former counsel herself
was ineffective is explored in Part III.B, infra.
54
See Rose, 455 U.S. at 518–19 (classifying as “mixed” any federal habeas petition that
contained even one unexhausted state claim).
55
The United States Supreme Court has authorized federal district courts confronted
with mixed petitions to issue a stay to allow the petitioner to return to state court to exhaust
his unexhausted claims if: (1) there is good cause for the failure to exhaust, (2) the claims are
potentially meritorious, and (3) there is no evidence of abusive or dilatory tactics. Rhines v.
Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005) (holding that when outright dismissal of petitioner’s
unexhausted claims would bar petitioner from later bringing them in federal court, district
courts may issue a stay-and-abeyance for a reasonable time period until petitioner can
exhaust all claims in state court). A further wrinkle would occur for the current counsel if the
newly discovered innocence claim is the only claim the former client intends to present to
the federal court and thus the entire petition is unexhausted. The Supreme Court has never
held that Rhines stays apply to a completely unexhausted petition, but three circuit courts
have applied Rhines in that context, and competent counsel should advise a former client to
raise this argument. See Hyman v. Keller, 10-6652, 2011 WL 3489092, at *10 (4th Cir. Aug.
10, 2011) (applying Rhines’s stay-and-abey procedure where previous state court dismissal
of habeas did not address unexhausted claim); Heleva v. Brooks, 581 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir.
2009) (finding that Rhines and other Supreme Court precedent allow for “protective” stayand-abey habeas petitions, “even where only unexhausted claims are at issue”); Dolis v.
Chambers, 454 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding previous order to allow Rhines
stay-and-abey procedure for unexhausted habeas petition).
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motion.
As this example demonstrates, acting to preserve a past client’s federal
habeas rights effectively converts former counsel into current counsel,
because fulfilling the Standard’s mandate essentially re-institutes the
original attorney–client relationship. The Standard does not address the
potential ethical, legal, practical, and financial difficulties prior counsel
might confront in fulfilling these post-representation responsibilities.
The impulse to impose additional ethical obligations upon the defense
bar as a way of correcting wrongful convictions is understandable. There is
no doubt that the wrongful conviction and incarceration of a criminal
defendant is horrific and tragic for that individual and his or her loved ones.
It is also undeniable that this kind of blatant injustice is abhorrent and
represents the ultimate breakdown in the criminal justice system. What is
contentious about the Standard is not its moral imperative but rather the
heavy burden it places on defense counsel to “act” in “some” way—both
defined and undefined—without taking into account the potential ethical,
reputational, practical, and financial costs such actions might incur.
II. LEGAL AND MORAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE INNOCENCE STANDARD
This section discusses the growing power of the Innocence Movement
to effect reforms within the criminal justice system, summarizes the most
prominent of those reforms, and then explores the impact of the movement
on the creation of new ethical standards for prosecutors and defense
attorneys.
A. THE INNOCENCE MOVEMENT

The Innocence Standard has no accompanying commentary as of the
writing of this Article. Nevertheless, the intent behind the creation of the
rule—to rectify miscarriages of justice—seems clear from the text and the
American Bar Association’s attentiveness to the problem of wrongful
convictions.56
The American Bar Association’s focus on this problem reflects a
building national consensus that the existence of so many exonerees is the
result of significant defects in the criminal justice system that are in need of
remedy.57 Over the last two decades, a sea change has taken place in the
56
See, e.g., ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 773 (describing the ABA’s 2008
decision to pass nine resolutions designed to “better ensure that individuals will not be
convicted of crimes they did not commit, and to compensate those who are exonerated”).
57
See generally Jon B. Gould & Richard A. Leo, One Hundred Years Later: Wrongful
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attention paid by lawyers to the problem of wrongful convictions, which in
turn has heightened public awareness of the problem and its horrific
consequences.58 Conservative estimates put the number of people serving
time in prison for crimes they did not commit in the tens of thousands.59 As
the number of exonerees has risen, innocence projects and other non-profit
organizations devoted to freeing and compensating the wrongfully
convicted have also grown in number.60 In recent years, the Innocence
Movement has resulted in “widespread systemic reform,” including greater
DNA collection and testing, changes to police investigative procedures,
rules to prevent prosecutorial misconduct, increased funding for capital

Convictions After a Century of Research, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 825 (2010)
(historical overview and comprehensive analysis of a century of wrongful convictions).
58
Kimberley A. Clow et al., Public Perception of Wrongful Conviction: Support for
Compensation and Apologies, 75 ALB L. REV. 1415, 1415 (2011/2012) (“With over 280
post-conviction DNA exonerations through Innocence Projects in the United States alone
and half a dozen Commissions of Inquiry into wrongful convictions in Canada, the public
may be more aware of wrongful convictions than ever before.”); Elizabeth S. Vartkessian &
Jared P. Tyler, Legal and Social Exoneration: The Consequences of Michael Toney’s
Wrongful Conviction, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1467, 1467 (2011/2012) (“In the last twenty years
increasing scholarly attention has been devoted to understanding the causes and
consequences of wrongful convictions.”).
59
In 2015, the National Registry of Exonerations released a report called The First 1,600
Exonerations, which documented the number of men and women exonerated from January
1989 through May 18, 2015. NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 1; see
also Medwed, supra note 10, at 131 (noting the lack of certainty surrounding the number of
wrongfully convicted prisoners). Most wrongful conviction cases do not involve DNA or
forensic evidence, which makes proving the wrongful conviction a great deal more difficult.
See NAT’L REGISTRY, 1600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 5, at 2 (noting that seventy-five
percent of exonerations do not involve DNA evidence). A recent study by the University of
Michigan estimated that 4.1% of the death-row population is innocent. Jan Hoffman, 4.1%
Are Said to Face Death on Convictions That Are False, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/02/science/convictions-of-4-1-percent-facing-death-saidto-be-false.html?_r=0. Conservative estimates put the number of those wrongfully convicted
of any felony at somewhere between two and eight percent. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent
People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/
articles/archives/2014/nov/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty. According to the United
States Department of Justice Bureau of Statistics, the United States has a prison population
of approximately 1,561,500 million people in 2014. E. Ann Carson, Prisoners in 2014,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=5387. Assuming a conviction rate error of two percent—a very
conservative estimate—that number translates into approximately 31,200 innocent people
behind bars. See id.
60
Innocence Network Member Organizations, THE INNOCENCE NETWORK, (Oct. 4, 2015,
3:16 PM), http://innocencenetwork.org/members/ (noting the existence of over fifty
organizations in the United States listed as “Innocence Projects.”).
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defense attorneys, and higher standards for attorneys representing these
clients.61
The Innocence Movement has had a profound impact on the American
Bar Association. In 2002, the Chair of the Criminal Justice Section
convened an Ad Hoc Innocence Committee to Ensure the Integrity of the
Criminal Process.62 The Ad Hoc Innocence Committee, made up of a crosssection of criminal justice experts including prosecutors, defense attorneys,
judges, and law professors, spent three years researching false confessions,
eyewitness identification procedures, forensic science, informants, defense
counsel practices, prosecution practices, and police investigative
techniques.63
The Ad Hoc Innocence Committee’s work resulted in a series of
policy recommendations, styled as nine resolutions, which were adopted by
the American Bar Association’s House of Delegates.64 The resolutions,
aimed at reforming police and prosecutorial procedures, recommended,
among other things: videotaping or audiotaping police interviews with
suspects, adopting specific procedures to improve the accuracy of line-up
and photo array identifications, requiring that crime laboratories and
coroner’s offices be accredited and follow standardized procedures,
refusing to prosecute a case solely on the basis of a jailhouse informant’s
testimony, increasing compensation for appointed defense counsel to
promote “high quality” representation, promoting greater accountability and
training for law enforcement officers, and providing more funding and
training for prosecutor offices.65 More broadly, the American Bar
Association adopted a resolution on “systemic remedies,” which exhorted
state and federal governments to “identify and attempt to eliminate the
causes of erroneous convictions.”66 One member of the committee
suggested that “[a] natural place for jurisdictions to begin to review local
laws and procedures is by comparing them to newly adopted ABA

61

Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and
Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capital Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 608 (2005); see also Kevin Johnson, Exonerations Hit
Record High of 125 in 2014, USA TODAY, Jan. 27, 2015, at 5A (noting that of the 125
exonerations on record for 2014, police and prosecutors cooperated in obtaining 67 of them).
62
ACHIEVING JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 766.
63
Id. at 773.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 773–88.
66
Id. at 787.
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innocence policies[.]”67
In 2008, the American Bar Association also amended Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.8 to significantly expand upon the prosecutor’s
responsibilities to turn over Brady material and to investigate postconviction cases potentially involving wrongful convictions.68 This
amended Rule, which applies only to prosecutors, now has two subsections
requiring that prosecutors take specific post-conviction actions upon
learning “of new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable
likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit [the] offense.”69
Specifically, the amended Rule directs the prosecutor to:
[P]romptly disclose that evidence to an appropriate court or authority, and . . . if the
conviction was obtained in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction, [to] promptly disclose that
evidence to the defendant unless a court authorizes delay, and [to] undertake further
investigation, or make reasonable efforts to cause an investigation, to determine
whether the defendant was convicted of an offense that the defendant did not
70
commit.

If the prosecutor’s investigation establishes by “clear and convincing
evidence” that the defendant is innocent, “the prosecutor shall seek to
remedy the conviction.”71
Finally, in February of 2015, the American Bar Association adopted
the prosecutorial version of the Innocence Standard. This new Standard,
formally known as Prosecution Function Standard 3-8.3, recommends that
prosecutors comply with Rule 3.8(g) and (h) whenever “a prosecutor learns
of credible and material information creating a reasonable likelihood that a
defendant was wrongfully convicted.”72 The second part of the standard
would require the prosecutor to “develop policies and procedures to address
such information[] and take actions that are consistent with applicable law,
rules, and the duty to pursue justice.”73 While the Standard is technically a
new standard of conduct for prosecutors, the obligations it imposes have
been in place since the amendment to Rule 3.8 in 2008.74
Given the American Bar Association’s extensive efforts to address the
67

Id. at 787–88.
MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 3.8(g)–(h).
69
Id. R. 3.8(g).
70
Id.
71
Id. R. 3.8(h).
72
PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 3–8.3.
73
Id.
74
See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 3.8(g)–(h) (using mandatory, “shall” language to
create an affirmative duty).
68
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problem of wrongful convictions, including its revision of Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 3.8, it is not surprising that the organization would
continue to propose additional innovative reforms. The newly-adopted
Innocence Standards for prosecutor and defense attorneys, which followed
the passage of the nine resolutions proposed by the Ad Hoc Innocence
Committee and the amendment to Rule 3.8, are such reforms. The evergrowing number of exonerees, and the empirical evidence of the depth and
breadth of the defects in the criminal justice system that account for their
existence, provide compelling reasons to embrace both of these new
Standards.
B. THE HOLISTIC MODEL OF REPRESENTATION

The development of the Innocence Standard was influenced by the
holistic model of representation, which is a philosophy of criminal defense
that has become increasingly popular among more progressive and wellfunded public defender and non-profit criminal defense organizations in the
United States.75 The Innocence Standard’s exhortation “to act” on behalf of
former clients fits neatly within the framework of holistic criminal defense,
which advocates for the “whole client” outside the confines of the pending
criminal case, using resources and skill-sets “beyond mere courtroom
advocacy.”76 Below, I explain that the holistic model of representation,
while undeniably admirable and effective, is impracticable in many
instances because it requires resources that many criminal defense attorneys
and less-well-funded public defense organizations do not have. As well, it
places defense counsel in a role that is outside of her traditional adversarial
function and may in some cases be at odds with it. The concomitant
obligations placed on defense counsel by the Innocence Standard raise the
same concerns.
Practitioners of the holistic model—primarily public defenders and
law school clinics, but also some attorneys in private practice—collapse the
distinction between “current” and “former” clients.77 These lawyers, in

75

Michael Pinard, Broadening the Holistic Mindset: Incorporating Collateral
Consequences and Reentry into Criminal Defense Lawyering, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1067,
1093–94 (2004) (listing a number of organizations that use the holistic model of
representation); Katherine E. Kinsey, Note, It Takes a Class: An Alternative Model of Public
Defense, 93 TEX. L. REV. 219, 252 (2014) (“As awareness of the holistic model of
representation has grown, more actors are willing to experiment with the model.”).
76
Kyung M. Lee, Comment, Reinventing Gideon v. Wainwright: Holistic Defenders,
Indigent Defendants, and the Right to Counsel, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 367, 371, 387–88 (2004).
77
See, e.g., Douglas Ammar, Georgia Justice Project Turns Lives Around Through
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addition to providing direct litigation services, navigate the collateral
consequences of sustaining a criminal conviction, which may include “the
loss or denial of public housing and other benefits, ineligibility for
employment-related licenses, a change in immigration status, damage to
one’s reputation in the community, and a myriad of other problems that do
not end at legal representation and disposal of the criminal case.”78 During
the litigation of the criminal case and long after its conclusion, defense
counsel attacks the “root causes” of the client’s predicament by helping the
client get access to drug treatment, benefits, childcare, psychological
counseling, and employment opportunities.
Public defenders, clinical law professors, and other aggressive
proponents of the holistic model also urge defense counsel to advocate for
proactive and preventative criminal law and policy measures, most
importantly by demanding that states provide adequate funding for indigent
defense.79 Pre-indictment, even pre-case, defense counsel are encouraged to
be impact litigators involved in the “legislative, policy, and planning
decisions that precede the trial.”80 Defense counsel are encouraged to
combat the race- and class-based portrayal of clients in the media and to
challenge the popular perception of criminal defendants as “guilty anyway”
and beyond redemption.81 This is done by “reach[ing] farther into clients’
lives and communities” to foster a richer understanding of the client’s life
Aggressive Defense, Holistic Relationships, CHAMPION, Jan.–Feb. 2004 at 50 (describing his
non-profit’s model; charting one client’s lifelong relationship with the project; and quoting
Representative John Lewis as saying: “A relationship with the Georgia Justice Project is a
relationship for life. You are like one big family. You are creating pockets of . . . the
Beloved Community.”).
78
Douglas Ammar & Tosha Downey, Transformative Criminal Defense Practice: Truth,
Love, and Individual Rights—The Innovative Approach of the Georgia Justice Project, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 49, 55 (2003). Under this conceptual framework, “the attorney–client
relationship is only the beginning of the relationship, not the end. It does not define the
boundary of [the] relationship.” Id. at 56. Lawyers at the Georgia Justice Project (GJP) work
with social workers to aid their clients with post-conviction matters, and employ some of
them in a landscaping business it owns and operates. Id. at 56–57.
79
Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the
Conceptual and Institutional Boundaries of Providing Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 401, 425–27 (2001) (“[Holistic defenders become] more active in the
democratic process by increasing their political involvement, consensus-building with other
groups that may be unlikely allies, and trying to secure a place for the defender voice at the
policy-making tables. They engage in direct lobbying on specific criminal justice issues and
organize public education campaigns.” (footnotes omitted)).
80
See Lee, supra note 76, at 390–91.
81
See David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 26
(1973).
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story and its impact on the current criminal case.82
The holistic model got a tremendous and unexpected endorsement in
2010, when the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defense
attorney violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective legal
representation by failing to advise his client that he could face deportation
by pleading guilty to transporting marijuana.83 Padilla v. Kentucky was
notable for its evisceration of the distinction between direct and collateral
consequences.84 Equally important was its focus on the whole client.
Defense counsel was duty-bound to consider and discuss the client’s life
prospects beyond the criminal case, at least within the context of
deportation.85
The opinion was notable for its sympathetic portrayal of the defendant
and its refusal to narrowly define the attorney–client relationship. The
Court began its opinion with a lengthy description of the defendant, a
Vietnam War veteran who “served . . . with honor” and lived as a lawful
permanent resident in the United States for more than forty years.86 Batting
down the argument that the criminal defense attorney’s role was limited to
advising a client about criminal penalties in the guilty plea context, the
Court noted that for many people, removal from the United States was
potentially a far harsher penalty than incarceration.87 The fact that
immigration law was a specialty outside of criminal defense counsel’s

82

See Brooks Holland, Holistic Advocacy: An Important but Limited Institutional Role,
30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 637, 639, 649 (2006) (quoting Robin Steinberg & David
Feige, Cultural Revolution: Transforming the Public Defender’s Office, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 123, 125 (2004)).
83
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359–60, 366, 369 (2010). The managing attorney
of the Civil Action Practice at The Bronx Defenders and the Director of Reentry Net
described the decision as an “earthquake” that “shocked commentators and practitioners
alike.” McGregor Smyth, From “Collateral” to “Integral”: The Seismic Evolution of
Padilla v. Kentucky and Its Impact on Penalties Beyond Deportation, 54 HOW. L.J. 795, 796,
798 (2011). According to Margaret Love, a former U.S. Pardon Attorney under the George
H.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations, “Padilla may turn out to be the most important
right to counsel case since Gideon, and the ‘Padilla advisory’ may become as familiar a
fixture of a criminal case as the Miranda warning.” Margaret Love & Gabriel J. Chin, The
“Major Upheaval” of Padilla v. Kentucky: Extending the Right to Counsel to the Collateral
Consequences of Conviction, CRIM. JUST. Summer 2010, at 36, 37.
84
Smyth, supra note 83, at 796, 798, 800.
85
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366, 369.
86
Id. at 359.
87
Id. at 368; see also id. at 370–71 n.11 (“[We think] any decent attorney would inform
the client of the consequences of his plea . . . [if it could result in] ‘banishment or exile[.]’”
(quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U. S. 388, 390–391 (1947))).
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bailiwick was no excuse; given the high stakes of permanent exile, it was
incumbent upon counsel to act in clear-cut cases by giving correct legal
advice about deportation consequences, and in less clear-cut cases, to
advise the client that deportation was, at least, a possibility.88
Many have agreed with the characterization of the Padilla decision as
“the most important right to counsel case since Gideon,”89 with far reaching
implications for the criminal defense attorney–client relationship. While
this interpretation may be correct, it bears emphasizing that Padilla
addressed current counsel’s obligations to a current client during the life of
the client’s criminal case. Padilla endorsed the holistic model of
representation within the plea and trial context. But nowhere in the decision
did the Supreme Court endorse the major tenet of the holistic model: that
the attorney–client relationship is unending and unbounded, with counsel’s
“imagination and desire to help [as] the only theoretical limits.”90
There are many reasons to embrace the holistic model of
representation, which is innovative, rigorous, and often extremely
effective.91 And there is an undeniable attraction in its recasting of defense
attorneys—the red-headed stepchildren of the criminal justice system who
some dismiss “as sleazy and unethical, one step away from the clients they
represent.”92 Under the holistic model, defense counsel is no longer the
despised mercenary who signs on to fight for the enemy and departs at
war’s conclusion to take up another equally repugnant cause. Rather, the
defense attorney is a mensch93 whose mission is to deliver the client, not
88

Id. at 369.
Love & Chin, supra note 83; see also César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, Criminal
Defense After Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475, 479–80 (2012) (“Padilla fits
within the important right to counsel line of cases that finds its roots in the infamous
Scottsboro Boys case, Powell v. Alabama, and its modern doctrinal formulation in Strickland
v. Washington[.]” (footnotes omitted)); Jenny Roberts, Proving Prejudice, Post-Padilla, 54
HOW. L.J. 693, 694 (2011) (“[Padilla is] monumental for ineffective-assistance [of counsel]
jurisprudence[.]”).
90
Lee, supra note 76, at 388.
91
Clarke, supra note 79, at 448–54 (describing the New York City-based Neighborhood
Defender Service of Harlem and Bronx Defenders, as well as the Public Defenders Service
of Washington, D.C., as practitioners of the holistic model with sterling reputations and
excellent results); Lee, supra note 76, at 400–01, 409–14 (providing a similar description of
the Community Law Office in Knoxville, Tennessee, and the Georgia Justice Project in
Atlanta).
92
Raymond, supra note 20, at 457 (footnotes omitted) (“[O]rdinary criminal defense
lawyer[s] . . . are not viewed as heroic. Far from it.”).
93
See In Our Words, BE A MENSCH, http://beamensch.com/what-is-a-mensch/in-ourwords/ (defining “Mensch” as “a Yiddish word meaning ‘a person of integrity and honor’”;
89
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from a righteous government adversary, but from the client’s own demons,
by providing access to a lifetime’s worth of aid: drug treatment,
psychological counseling, job training, anger management, government
benefits, employment, and even friendship, staying in close touch long after
the criminal case is a distant memory.94 The same might be said for the new
Innocence Standard, which has prior defense counsel wearing the
proverbial white hat, riding in to the rescue at the eleventh hour—long after
her shift is over. The Innocence Standard emphatically rejects the idea of an
attorney–client relationship that is bounded by time or similar pedestrian
constraints (money, resources, legal training).
At the same time, there are reasons to be cautious of the holistic
model, even wary—concerns that apply with equal force when considering
the potential complications of the Innocence Standard. The efficacy of the
holistic model of representation is premised on partnerships with social
workers, judges, prosecutors, religious leaders, and community members—
all persons who have different roles in the system and are often opposed to
defense counsel’s core function. One commentator noted that the
organizations that subscribe to the holistic ethos have “turned the image of
the knee-jerk liberal defense lawyer on its head and have, in effect, become
crime fighters themselves.”95 But defense counsel is emphatically not a
“crime fighter;” that job belongs to the prosecution and the police. A
defense attorney’s legal and ethical obligation is fundamentally different,
and often diametrically opposed.96

someone who “does what is right because it is right towards family, towards strangers, at
home and in public”).
94
Ammar & Downey, supra note 78, at 57 (noting that GJP lawyers view themselves as
providers of “wraparound” social services and fierce advocates for clients years after the
criminal case has concluded). “Once released ‘from prison or jail, [the GJP] offer[s] a
variety of social services such as individual and group counseling, GED and literacy classes,
monthly support dinners, and employment with [its landscaping] business.’” Id. at 57
(quoting Douglas B. Ammar, Forgiveness and the Law—A Redemptive Opportunity, 27
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1583, 1593 (2000)). GJP dismisses concerns raised by criminal
practitioners and experts “that such amorphous boundaries cause problems in the attorney–
client relationship and are beyond the scope of professionalism” as unfounded, stating, “[w]e
have found the opposite to be true. More permeable boundaries allow our clients to trust us
more and begin to see us as true advocates.” Id. at 56.
95
David E. Rovella, The Best Defense . . ., NAT’L L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at A1; accord
Clarke, supra note 79, at 404–05 (stating that holistic defenders “see their role broadly” to
include “occasionally initiating projects with police, prosecutors, and corrections officials to
address specific problems facing communities.”).
96
Then, too, there is the uncomfortable fact that the holistic model is at heart
paternalistic. As one commentator wrote, this type of approach “risks condescending clients
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Of course, the vast majority of criminal cases result in guilty pleas that
are the result of brokered agreements between defense counsel and her
adversaries.97 The more collegiality and goodwill that exist between the two
sides, the more likely they will cooperate and even collaborate on a
favorable outcome for the client.98 But at the same time, defense counsel
must always be ready to take on prosecutors and police, and perhaps just as
importantly, to be seen as someone who embraces that challenge.99 Defense
counsel’s core mission, and to some degree, political capital, is based upon
being an advocate who squares off against the vast resources of the state
without flinching.100 To be sure, practitioners of holistic representation
maintain their commitment to the adversarial model.101 But some critics
question whether the holistic model leaves some lawyers unprepared to
aggressively litigate on behalf of clients who are despised “even in the
communities from which they come,” because the lawyers’ default mode
has become conciliatory and cooperative rather than antagonistic.102
The critique of the holistic model as potentially contradicting defense
severely” by implying that: “Because you are poor, we are not only going to defend you, we
are going to fix you.” Holland, supra note 82, at 646. Many clients welcome the kind of
individualized attention and wraparound services the holistic model provides; others
however, may chafe at what they view as intrusiveness and the presumption that the lawyer
has the competence to determine not only their best legal interests, but their best “life
outcomes” as well. Id.
97
See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 10, 2012) (“More than 90 percent of criminal cases are never tried before a jury.”),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.
html?_r=0; Rakoff, supra note 59 (“In 2013 . . . more than 97 percent of [federal criminal
charges] were resolved through plea bargains, and fewer than 3 percent went to trial.”).
98
See, e.g., Michael M. O’Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L.
REV. 407, 416 (2008); Jack E. Fernandez & Caroline Judge Mehta, Criminal Cases:
Representing Individual Officers and Directors, FOR THE DEF., Jan. 2006, at 39, 41.
99
See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2478 (2004) (“If a lawyer is bent on plea bargaining and does so all the time, he
cannot credibly threaten to go to trial. Prosecutors will offer fewer concessions to these
lawyers’ clients because they do not have to offer more.” (footnotes omitted)).
100
See Holland, supra note 82, at 644–46.
101
Steinberg & Feige, supra note 82, at 124 (“Trial skills and aggressive courtroom
advocacy remain a mainstay of a [holistic model].”).
102
See AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, SECOND CHANCES
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41–42 (2007) (describing the views of some in the defense
bar who argue that a public defender’s focus should be on the courtroom and if those
“office[s] elevate[] social work and community-outreach practice institutionally, [they] risk[]
professional imbalance with [their] lawyers losing focus on their core role of plea
negotiation and trial litigation”), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
cecs/secondchances.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Holland, supra note 82, at 642, 646–48.
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counsel’s fundamental purpose and even inhibiting counsel from carrying
out her adversarial responsibilities in the courtroom is very similar to the
critique of the Innocence Standard. Both the holistic model and the
Innocence Standard have their geneses in expanding and improving upon
counsel’s delivery of services under the Sixth Amendment. But in their
quest to better the system, do they inadvertently subvert it? This question
becomes more pointed in the face of a harsh reality: for the vast majority of
lawyers who represent indigent clients, there are not enough hours in the
day to be a holistic attorney, even if they might like to be. This critique
applies with equal force to the Innocence Standard, which may require
investigative steps and legal expertise that are impracticable for the vast
majority of criminal defenders. These complications and the ethical
implications of the Standard—including the expansion of defense counsel’s
role from advocate to truth-seeker and attendant conflicts of interest—are
discussed below.
III. THE ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DILEMMAS POSED
BY THE INNOCENCE STANDARD
A. THE PROBLEM WITH PARITY

This section discusses in more detail the ethical dilemmas that the
Innocence Standard may pose. First, establishing parity in the
responsibilities of prosecutors and defense attorneys incorrectly suggests
that they play the same role in the system. Second, requiring defense
counsel to act upon the discovery of exculpatory evidence in connection
with a former client may violate her duty to a current client. Creating
additional obligations to “act” on behalf of former clients may draw scarce
resources away from current clients because most defense attorneys are
already under-resourced despite facing excessive caseloads.
The two Innocence Standards for prosecutors and defense attorneys,
adopted simultaneously, establish an ethical parity regarding the duty to act
when newly discovered evidence of innocence surfaces in an old case.
While parity has surface appeal, it fails to reflect the fundamentally
different nature of these attorneys’ respective roles. (The ABA appeared to
implicitly recognize this in 2008, when it amended Rule 3.8 but did not
create a related rule for defense attorneys.) The Innocence Standard for
prosecutors simply restates a duty already imposed by the Constitution and
underscores the prosecutor’s ethical obligations under Rule 3.8, while
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providing some additional explication.103 By contrast, the new Innocence
Standard for defense attorneys has no precedent in any existing ethical rule
or legal dictate.
There is good reason for this discrepancy: the roles of defense counsel
and the prosecutor do not mirror each other. Unlike defense counsel, who
represents an individual, the prosecutor represents the public writ large.104
Defense counsel must advocate zealously on behalf of her living, breathing
client; the prosecutor directs her zeal toward the abstract pursuit of the
administration of justice.105 Because prosecutors are bound to represent the
broader public and to make sure that the system is fair, they “are subject to
constraints and responsibilities that don’t apply to other lawyers.”106
It makes sense to subject a prosecutor to the obligations in Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.8 and the new prosecution Innocence Standard
because those obligations are entirely consistent with the prosecutor’s

103

See Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that the state
has a duty in the post-conviction context “to turn over exculpatory evidence relevant to [an]
instant habeas proceeding” when such evidence is in its possession); see also Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 55 (1988) (describing the constitutional right to access
exculpatory evidence).
It should be noted that some scholars have questioned whether the law is settled on
whether a prosecutor who receives Brady material post-conviction is constitutionally
obligated to disclose it to the defendant. E.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in
Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 171, 190 (2005) (“[N]o court has
directly applied Brady to the postconviction context.”). But see id. at 191 (“When a
convicted defendant files a collateral attack within statutorily prescribed time limits and the
prosecutor comes into possession of exculpatory evidence that would help the defendant
establish an element of the collateral claim itself, disclosure may be required.”).
104
Compare DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b), with PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 17 § 3–1.2(b).
105
Compare DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b), with PROSECUTION
STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 3–1.2(a)–(b).
106
United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). The Supreme Court in Berger v. United States described the
role of prosecutors more forcefully:
[He] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim
of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness
and vigor—indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.

295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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primary obligation to “serve truth and justice first.”107 Indeed, the
prosecutor’s obligation “to act” to exonerate a wrongfully convicted person
is well-established.108 Defense counsel, however, has no constitutional or
ethical obligation to seek truth and justice; in fact, such an obligation at
times would be irreconcilable with defense counsel’s core obligations.109 Of
course, defense counsel is an officer of the court and cannot knowingly
present false evidence or otherwise perpetrate a fraud.110 But refraining
from plainly dishonest acts is not the same as fulfilling a proactive and
continuing duty to ferret out the truth on behalf of a former client.
For defense counsel, the Innocence Standard’s mandate to “act” in
“some” way on behalf of a former, potentially innocent client is not so
easily reconciled with counsel’s narrowly prescribed but deeply
consequential role in the criminal justice system. And, as explained below,
the Standard’s action-imperative with respect to former clients may conflict
with defense counsel’s preexisting constitutional and ethical obligations to
current clients. The moral attraction of the Innocence Standard is
undeniable. The hard question is whether the Standard is justified, taking
full account of the moral, legal, and practical complications.
B. SERVING TWO MASTERS

The language of the Innocence Standard is deceptively simple: “When
defense counsel becomes aware of credible and material evidence or law
creating a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent, counsel has
some duty to act.”111 But what is former counsel to do if the source of
“evidence” that “creates [the] reasonable likelihood” comes from a current
client who is unwilling to let counsel share the information? This situation
107

Id. at 1323.
See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) (stating that prosecutors
are “bound by the ethics of [their] office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired
or other information that casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction”); MODEL
RULES, supra note 22, R. 3.8 (setting forth the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory and
mitigating information).
109
See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b), (e) (stating that defense
counsel’s “primary duties” are “to serve as their clients’ counselor and advocate with
courage and devotion; to ensure that constitutional and other legal rights of their clients are
protected; and to render effective, high-quality legal representation with integrity” as a
“professional representative” of the accused); see also Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of
American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 123 n.15 (1987).
110
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b).
111
Id. § 4–9.4(a).
108
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could arise because the current client is the true perpetrator, is related or
close to the true perpetrator, or is simply unwilling to be outed as a
“snitch.” Absent very narrowly-drawn exceptions, the attorney–client
privilege protects all private communications, however reasonable or
unreasonable the client’s motivations for insisting on secrecy.112 When the
duty of confidentiality conflicts with the imperative of the Standard, it
would appear to prohibit former counsel from doing what the Standard
commands.113
The Innocence Standard does not address the complications facing a
trial attorney caught between the warring demands of two clients, the
current “confessor” client and the “former” innocent one, each with
apparently co-equal claims on her duties of loyalty and zealous
representation.114 To satisfy the demands of the innocent client, she must
112

In the Matter of John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Mass. 1990)
(“The privilege of insisting that the attorney keep confidential the client’s disclosures made
to the attorney in his or her professional capacity belongs only to the client, and therefore
can be waived only by the client, . . . or, in some instances at least, by the executor or
administrator of the client’s estate.” (citation omitted)). In Swidler & Berlin v. United States,
the Supreme Court noted the scant number of exceptions to the attorney–client privilege and
expressly declined the government’s invitation to create a further exception allowing an
attorney to reveal a client’s confidences after the client had died, stating: “A ‘no harm in one
more exception’ rationale could contribute to the general erosion of the privilege, without
reference to common-law principles or ‘reason and experience.’” 524 U.S. 399, 409–10
(1998). Existing exceptions include “the crime-fraud exception [and] the exceptions for
claims relating to attorney competence or compensation[.]” Id. at 414 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). Some jurisdictions also provide for an exception where the client tells his
attorney of his intent to commit a future crime. See, e.g., John Doe Grand Jury
Investigation, 562 N.E.2d at 72 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
113
The conflict arises within the text of the Standard, which mandates that counsel “act”
on behalf of a current client and maintain her duty of confidentiality to a former client. See
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a).
114
See id. Some might argue that this conflict is a straw man, readily resolved by the
application of other Standards and the Model Rules. But only one Standard appears directly
on point, and it appears to conflict with the Innocence Standard rather than clarify its
application. Standard 4–1.7(b) states that “Defense counsel should not permit their
professional judgment or obligations regarding the representation of a client to be adversely
affected by loyalties or obligations to other, former, or potential clients[.]” Id. § 4–1.7(b).
That Standard does not carve out an exception for the Innocence Standard’s “duty to act” on
behalf of a possibly innocent client “even after counsel’s representation is ended.” Id. § 4–
9.4. Nor does the Innocence Standard carve out an exception for the Conflict of Interest
Standard, leaving open the question of which Standard defense counsel should follow when
compliance with both is impossible. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct refer
obliquely to the possibility of such a conflict but do not resolve it. For example, consider the
rule governing a counsel’s duties to former clients. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.9.
Rule 1.9 instructs a lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter not to represent
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betray the confidences of the current client and violate what is one of the
oldest and most sacrosanct privileges.115 To serve the current client, she
must abandon the wrongfully convicted person she represented at trial,
perpetuating a gross miscarriage of justice and frustrating the truth-finding
function of the court.116 There is nothing in the wording of the proposed
Standard to guide the attorney who faces this dilemma.117
This scenario is not as far-fetched as it may seem.118 The vast majority
a subsequent client in a “substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are
materially adverse to the interests of the former client[.]” Id. R. 1.9(a). Rule 1.9 also states
that
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter . . . shall not thereafter: (1) use
information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client except as these
Rules would permit or require with respect to a client . . . or (2) reveal information relating to the
representation except as these Rules would permit or require with respect to a client.

Id. R. 1.9(c). But it is hard to see how Rule 1.9 resolves the counsel’s conflict. The counsel
is not seeking to use information to the “disadvantage” of the former client but rather to that
client’s advantage. The latter part of the rule forbids disclosure of information relating to the
former representation except as permitted by the Rules, Id., and the Proposed Standard
explicitly grants that permission. DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4. The problem
is not disadvantageous disclosure to the former client, it is disclosure that advantages the
former client to the disadvantage of the current one. Rule 1.16 states that “a lawyer shall not
represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the
representation of a client if: [] the representation will result in violation of the rules of
professional conduct or other law.” MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.16(a)(1). The Rule
also provides that withdrawal from the representation of a current client is permissible if
there will be no “material adverse effect on the interests of the client” or “other good cause
for withdrawal exists.” Id. R. 1.16(b). It is conceivable that defense counsel could seek to
terminate her relationship with her current client to fulfill her innocence-obligations to her
former client on the grounds that failing to do so would violate the Innocence Standard or
under the catchall “other good cause.” But it is difficult to see how withdrawal would make
any difference. It would not vitiate the duty of confidentiality that protects the information
that has already been exchanged between the lawyer and the client whom she seeks leave to
withdraw from representing.
115
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
116
See, e.g., Swidler & Berlin, 524 U.S. at 413–14 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing
that refusing to provide an exception to protect the interests of an innocent defendant “may
distort the record, mislead the factfinder, and undermine the central truth-seeking function of
the courts”); State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ariz. 1976) (in banc) (arguing that
the privilege should give way where it frustrates the constitutional right of the accused to
present a defense to a criminal charge and compel the attendance of witnesses to provide
relevant testimony) (Holohan, J., specially concurring).
117
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a).
118
See, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969–74 (8th Cir. 1982). As
described by Susan Voss, “Agosto involved an appeal of the disqualification of three
attorneys who had separately represented three of the numerous codefendants in the case.
One defense attorney had previously represented six grand jury witnesses, one codefendant
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of criminal defendants are indigent and represented by court-appointed
counsel, usually a lawyer from the public defender’s office.119 Public
defender offices operate like law firms, so that a client of one defender is a
client of the entire office.120 A lawyer in a public defender’s office,
therefore, carries a list of former clients containing every individual that
other public defenders in her office—past or present—have ever
represented.121 Even in relatively small public defender offices in rural
areas, this translates into thousands of people.122
Additionally, many public defender offices see the same types of cases
over and over again. For example, in jurisdictions encompassing poor urban
neighborhoods, many of the defendants may be charged with shootings
associated with the same rival gangs; in jurisdictions encompassing more
rural areas, a large number of clients may be involved in the manufacture,

until indicted, and another codefendant until arraigned. A second defense attorney had
previously represented both a potential trial witness and a codefendant at a grand jury
investigation. A third defense attorney had previously represented a codefendant for six
years.” Susan Voss, Right to Counsel, 71 GEO. L.J. 589, 607 n.1876 (1982) (citations
omitted).
119
Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive Caseloads
as Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 422 (2012) (“Ninety-five
percent of convictions are the result of plea bargains. Most defendants who plead guilty are
represented by public defenders.” (footnotes omitted)); Robert P. Mosteller, Failures of the
American Adversarial System to Protect the Innocent and Conceptual Advantages in the
Inquisitorial Design for Investigative Fairness, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 319, 326
(2011) (“In the United States, over 80% of those charged with felonies are indigent.”).
120
MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.0(c); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 n.17 (May 13, 2006) (discussing the ethical obligations
of lawyers who represent indigent criminal defendants when excessive caseloads interfere
with competent and diligent representation; “for purposes of the Model Rules, a public
defender’s office . . . is considered to be the equivalent of a law firm”).
121
See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.0(c).
122
Dianne E. Courselle, When Clinics Are “Necessities Not Luxuries”: Special
Challenges of Running a Criminal Appeals Clinic in a Rural State, 75 MISS. L.J. 721, 728–
29 (2006) (“One problem identified in ‘Gideon’s Broken Promise’ is a ‘lack of conflict-free
representation’ for indigent defendants. The report cites hearing witnesses from three states
in which individual attorneys or attorneys in the same office sometimes represent defendants
with conflicting interests. A contract public defender from Montana, for example, explained:
‘Lawyers in smaller, more rural counties in Montana are neither inclined nor trained to take
cases when there are co-defendants or there is a conflict with the contract public defender.
One contract defender advised me that the rural nature of his practice seems to encourage
conflicts.’” (footnotes omitted)); cf. Gary T. Lowenthal, Successive Representation by
Criminal Lawyers, 93 YALE L.J. 1, 8 (1983) (“It is not unusual for a single public defender
office to represent tens of thousands of defendants each year.”).
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distribution, and use of drugs, such as methamphetamine.123 The repeat and
interconnected nature of the offenses suggest that the chances are not
insignificant that defense counsel will represent a client who reveals
information that tends to exonerate a past client of her office.
While a public defender office will declare a conflict of interest in
cases that implicate the interest of any past or present client,124 the office
may not know of the conflict of interest until the representation of the
current client is underway.125 At that point, the duty of confidentiality has
attached, silencing defense counsel at exactly the point when the Innocence
Standard demands that she speak out.126 Declaring a conflict of interest and
ceasing to represent the current client in order to act on behalf of the former
client is explicitly precluded by the Conflict of Interest Standard 4-1.7,
which provides: “[d]efense counsel should not permit their professional
judgment or obligations regarding the representation of a client to be
adversely affected by loyalties or obligations to other, former, or potential
clients.”127
123

See Meghan Clyne, Taking It to the Streets, PHILANTHROPY MAG., Summer 2009
(“It’s brutal, terrifying, and on the rise. From coast to coast, gang crime ravages inner cities,
destroys families, and causes whole neighborhoods to hunker down in fear. According to a
federal report released earlier this year, criminal gangs now count roughly one million
members—and are responsible for some 80 percent of crimes committed in American
communities.”); Alan Elsner, Methamphetamine Scourge Sweeps Rural America, REUTERS,
Jan. 29, 2005, available at www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1331718/posts?page=71
(quoting North Dakota Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem as saying “When we look at our
prison population, 10 years ago nobody had even heard of it. Now 60 percent of our male
inmates are users and we’re building a brand new prison for female users[.]”); see also
Bibas, supra note 99, at 2439 (“[Public defenders are] high-volume repeat players in the
criminal arena.”).
124
Jeff Brown, Disqualification of the Public Defender: Toward a New Protocol for
Resolving Conflicts of Interest, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 19 (1996) (arguing public defenders
should not handle cases that would require them to attack these former clients through crossexamination or other means if they possess material information acquired from their
personal representation of former clients or from the representation by the public defender
office).
125
See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 162–63 (1988) (stating that conflicts of
interest are “notoriously hard [for defense counsel] to predict” in the pretrial stage of the
proceedings); Brown, supra note 124, at 6 (“Usually, the conflict is clear in a joint
representation case, but problems may arise where the issue is more nebulous, such as in
cases where victims and witnesses are former or current clients of the same public defender
office representing the accused.”).
126
See MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.6.
127
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.7(b). Normally, conflicts of interest for
public defenders fall into one of four categories: (1) joint representation of co-defendants;
(2) challenges by the client to the attorney’s effectiveness; (3) cases in which a victim or
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The language of Conflict of Interest Standard 4-1.7 also appears to
preclude, or at least complicate, any efforts by defense counsel to persuade
the current client to allow defense counsel “to act” upon the newly
discovered evidence of wrongful conviction by disclosing it. If the
disclosure could cause the present client or the present client’s family
member or friend to be investigated or charged with the crime for which the
former client was convicted, the disclosure would have an obvious adverse
impact on the current client’s interests. If disclosure would mean that the
current client is revealed as a “snitch,” his or her life might be put in
danger.128 Under any of these circumstances, it cannot be said that defense
counsel would be “zealous[ly] advocat[ing]” for the current client with
“courage and devotion,” as Standard 4-1.2(b) requires.129
If defense counsel “becomes aware of credible and material
evidence . . . creating a reasonable likelihood that a . . . former client was
wrongfully convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent”130 because of
information revealed in confidence by a current client, it does not appear
that defense counsel can “act” in any way without the latter’s express
consent.131 For all the reasons described above, the current client may,
wisely, refuse to give consent. Preexisting conflict of interest rules will
estop defense counsel from trying to change the current client’s mind,132
while the long-standing constitutional and ethically imposed duty of
confidentiality will prevent defense counsel from alerting the former client,
the former client’s current counsel, or anyone else.133 In this situation, it
seems that compliance with the Innocence Standard is ethically
impracticable, if not impossible.
C. SELF-INTEREST

A separate problem arises if the new evidence pointing to a former

witness is a former client of the public defender; and (4) cases where the victim is a current
client. Brown, supra note 124, at 7–8.
128
See, e.g., Liza I. Karsai, You Can’t Give My Name: Rethinking Witness Anonymity in
Light of the United States and British Experience, 79 TENN. L. REV. 29, 38–44 (2011)
(surveying federal cases in which witnesses were given anonymity after court determined
their informant testimony placed their lives in danger).
129
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–1.2(b); see also MODEL RULES, supra note
22, R. 1.7.
130
DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4.
131
MODEL RULES, supra note 22, R. 1.6 cmt. 4.
132
See id. R. 1.9.
133
Id. R. 1.6.
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client’s innocence also points to counsel’s incompetence. That is, what if
the new, potentially exonerating information could and should have been
discovered by defense counsel by the time of trial? Imagine a scenario in
which a public defender, overwhelmed by a crushing caseload and facing
back-to-back trials, neglects to interview an alibi witness for a client.
Because defense counsel has not had the time or resources to undertake a
thorough pretrial investigation of the case, counsel is unaware of the crucial
nature of the testimony the witness would provide. The witness, perhaps
someone with his own criminal record, is reluctant to get involved and
makes no attempt to contact defense counsel at the time. Following the
client’s conviction and sentencing, the alibi witness, now consciencestricken, comes forward with an account of the defendant’s whereabouts at
the time of the offense and documentary proof (a cell phone video, a credit
card receipt, a time-stamped parking ticket) establishing that the client was
elsewhere when the crime occurred.
The failure to interview such a crucial and exonerating witness would
appear on its face to be deficient performance.134 Given the strength of the
evidence—its corroboration by documentation—it also appears that defense
counsel’s failure to present it at trial prejudiced the defendant because, had
the jury heard the alibi evidence, there is a “reasonable probability
that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.”135 It is
comforting to believe that any defense counsel would “act” immediately
upon receipt of this information in all of the ways contemplated by the
Innocence Standard. In such a clear-cut case, the author believes most
probably would, even without the Standard to prod them.
But the consequences of admitting ineffectiveness can be profoundly
damaging. If a court were to determine that this deficient performance
prejudiced the former client, defense counsel’s professional reputation
would suffer greatly.136 Many state disciplinary authorities can impose
134

See, e.g., Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1094–96 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the
failure by defense counsel to interview witnesses who could have demonstrated the
defendant’s factual innocence constitutes deficient performance).
135
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (holding that, in order to
establish prejudice from ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must show reasonable
probability that a proceeding would have been different absent “counsel’s unprofessional
errors”).
136
Many published opinions concluding that a defendant suffered from ineffective
assistance of counsel refer to defense counsel by name. To cite just one example, Los
Angeles-based criminal defense attorney Ted Yamamoto was found to have provided
ineffective assistance of counsel by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 2002 decision,
which used his name more than seventy times. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 919–21 (9th
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sanctions on an attorney for providing ineffective assistance of counsel,
ranging from a reprimand to a suspension of the license to practice law.137
With these stakes in mind, some criminal defense attorneys might balk at
complying with the Innocence Standard, downplaying the significance of
the new evidence or questioning its legitimacy, knowing that “a finding that
the lawyer has been ineffective can cause the lawyer damage, including
casting a shadow on the lawyer’s reputation, undermining the lawyer’s
future earning potential, and exposing the lawyer to possible professional
discipline or a claim for legal malpractice.”138
The impulse to dismiss or minimize the new evidence may not be
entirely conscious. A wealth of behavioral economics research
demonstrates that lawyers—like other professionals—are prone to bias
when self-interest is at stake, “unconsciously focusing on evidence that
supports a preordained conclusion and discounting evidence that does not
fit.”139 If a few facts in the above-stated hypothetical were to change,
making the newly discovered evidence less compelling, counsel’s natural
proclivity to “search[] for arguments that will support an already-made
judgment”140 might grow stronger, causing the likelihood that defense
counsel will “act” to fall accordingly. What if, for example, the witness
provided no documentation or other evidence to support the alibi? What if
the witness is a parent, sibling, or spouse? Or what if the witness, while
personally unattached to the client, has a significant criminal record that
would be used by a prosecutor to impeach his credibility?
Under these factual scenarios, many lawyers might determine that the
evidence does not meet the Innocence Standard’s “credible and material”
threshold, and therefore disregard it. While some might argue that
disregarding such evidence is the right choice, because it spares defense
counsel from chasing frivolous claims, others would conclude such

Cir. 2002) (outlining Yamamoto’s deficient performance).
137
See, e.g., In re Wolfram, 847 P.2d 94, 103–04 (Ariz. 1993) (in banc); The Florida Bar
v. Sandstrom, 609 So. 2d 583, 584–85 (Fla. 1992); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v.
McKinney, 668 S.W.2d 293, 298 (Tenn. 1984). Counsel may also fear the former client
filing a lawsuit seeking damages for malpractice. See Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking
Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 6–7
(1995).
138
Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 U.
KAN. L. REV. 43, 75–76 (2009) (footnotes omitted).
139
Id. at 69–70.
140
Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist
Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 818 (2001).
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evidence is “credible and material.”141 Prosecutors, who have been bound to
follow the Brady rule for more than fifty years, have a wealth of training
and experience in applying the materiality standard in the context of
investigating and disclosing information that may be exculpatory.142 By
contrast, many defense counsel have no training or experience in applying
the materiality standard.143 That lack of training and experience, combined
with a bias toward self-protection, suggests that defense counsel may err on
the side of inaction.
As of yet, no commentary to the revised Prosecution and Defense
Function Standards has been written. To better ensure compliance with the
Innocence Standard, I suggest that the commentary accompanying the
Innocence Standard should provide a detailed definition of “material and
credible.” Perhaps most importantly, states and jurisdictions should
consider immunizing from discipline defense attorneys who follow through

141

Thomas K. Maher, Worst of Times, and Best of Times: The Eighth Amendment
Implication of Increased Procedural Reliability on Existing Death Sentences, 1 ELON L.
REV. 95, 104 (2009) (“Brady requires disclosure of exculpatory evidence, and results in
reversal only when the evidence that is not disclosed is material, a standard about which
judges and defense counsel often disagree.”); Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory
Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective
Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 391, 448 (1984) (stating that the Supreme Court has given
inadequate guidance in defining Brady, resulting in “unreliable and biased determinations”
of what evidence must be disclosed to the defendant).
142
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith
or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
143
This does not hold true for all defense counsel, as some are former prosecutors. See
Bobby G. Frederick, Why It Matters if Your Defense Lawyer Used to be a Prosecutor, TRIAL
THEORY (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.trialtheory.com/credibility/why-it-matters-if-yourdefense-lawyer-used-to-be-a-prosecutor/ (“There are many local defense attorneys who are
former prosecutors[.]”). And, of course, defense attorneys are familiar with applying the
materiality standard in other contexts, i.e., in motions seeking discovery or to overturn a
conviction based on a Brady violation. See Lara Bazelon, “A Mistake Has Benn Made Here,
and No One Wants to Correct It”, SLATE MAG. (Dec. 17, 2013), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/12/the_exoneration_of_kash_register_and_th
e_problem_of_false_eyewitness_testimony.html (detailing the post-conviction litigation of a
Brady claim). But many defense attorneys have no experience applying the Brady Rule ex
ante—that is, looking forward in time to try to predict whether a particular piece of evidence
may become “material” at some later point. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady
v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 543–48 (2007)
(describing how a prosecutor’s open-file policy can lull defense counsel into believing there
has been full disclosure under Brady when in fact there has only been full disclosure under
the local rules of discovery).
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on their ethical responsibility under the Innocence Standard so that they
need not fear significant damage to their professional reputation or license
to practice law.
D. RESOURCES

Indigent criminal defense in this country is in crisis, and has been for
decades.144 Indigent defendants make up the vast majority of criminal
cases,145 meaning that their legal representatives are public defenders or
private practitioners paid by the court, usually under a contract with a strict
fee cap.146 In many states, the cap is set so low that it precludes anything
but the most minimal representation.147 Given lack of funding at both the
state and federal level, many defender offices suffer from budget cuts and
layoffs, and contract attorney fees have not risen to adjust for the cost of
living or inflation.148
144

AM. BAR ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS,
GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE: A REPORT
ON THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S HEARINGS ON THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS v (2004), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_
aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authc
heckdam.pdf [hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE] (“Forty years after Gideon v.
Wainwright, indigent defense in the United States remains in a state of crisis, resulting in a
system that lacks fundamental fairness and places poor persons at constant risk of wrongful
conviction.”). A previous report authored on the adequacy of funding for indigent defense by
the ABA’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants in 1983 (Gideon’s
twentieth anniversary) reached the same conclusion. See id. at 7.
145
Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United
States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 31 (1995) (“It is not uncommon for indigent defense
programs to represent up to 90 percent of all criminal defendants in a given felony
jurisdiction.”).
146
See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 145, at 32–37 (describing the different
categories of indigent defense services).
147
Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1291–92 (2013); see GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note
144, at ii.
148
Bibas, supra note 147. Professor Bibas detailed the crisis these attorneys are facing:
Appointed defense counsel are underpaid, undersupported, and overworked. They are often paid
flat fees or low hourly rates subject to low caps. At a rate of, say, $50 per hour subject to a
$1,000 cap, appointed counsel receives no compensation for investing more than twenty hours in
taking a case to trial. These rates are often below market rates and not adjusted for inflation.
They hardly suffice to cover a law firm’s basic overhead, including rent and secretaries, let alone
compensate counsel at anything near market rates. Funding for experts, paralegals, and
investigators is scant. Caseloads are staggering and increasing far faster than the numbers of
lawyers or the funding available for them.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
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The longstanding problem is no secret. In December of 2004, the
American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Legal Aid and
Indigent Defendants published a groundbreaking, comprehensive study of
the legal representation in this area, entitled Gideon’s Broken Promise:
America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice—written to coincide with
the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision
establishing the right to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright.149 As the name of
the report suggests, the authors came to “the disturbing conclusion that
thousands of persons are processed through America’s courts every year []
with . . . a lawyer who does not have the time, resources, or in some cases
the inclination to provide effective representation.”150 Gideon’s Broken
Promise attributed the breakdown in representation to a number of factors,
including “shamefully inadequate” funding of public defender
organizations and appointed counsel contract services.151 The lack of
funding left these lawyers underpaid, without the money for experts or
investigators and without the number of coworkers necessary to carry a
reasonable caseload.152
The report is a stunning indictment: “Taken as whole, glaring
deficiencies in indigent defense services result in a fundamentally unfair
criminal justice system that constantly risks convicting persons who are
genuinely innocent of the charges lodged against them.”153 The risk is not
hypothetical, it is an empirical fact.154 Many wrongful conviction cases
share a chilling similarity: the clients were represented by attorneys who
were unable, often because they lacked the resources, to be anything other
than constitutionally inadequate.155 Although the authors of Gideon’s
Broken Promise conceded that the conviction of the innocent was not solely
the result of ineffective assistance of counsel, they nonetheless concluded
that criminal defense attorneys who received good training and sufficient
resources were crucial to preventing these kinds of injustices.156

149

See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 144, at ii. The report detailed the
American Bar Association’s findings from a series of public hearings in which thirty-two
expert witnesses testified about the quality of indigent legal representation in twenty-two
different states. Id. at iv.
150
Id. at iv.
151
Id. at 38.
152
Id. at 16.
153
Id. at 7.
154
See id. at 7–28.
155
See id. at 16.
156
See id. passim.
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The fiftieth anniversary of Gideon has passed and not much has
changed. Indeed, it is arguable that the problems afflicting the delivery of
indigent defense services are, if anything, more dire.157 The Great
Recession of 2008, combined with sequestration—the across-the-board
slashing of the federal budget—have deepened state and county budget cuts
while creating a new crisis. In 2013, the federal public defender system was
forced to lay off attorneys and staff and take other draconian belt-tightening
measures after its funding was cut by fifty-one million dollars.158
In light of this harsh reality, does it make sense to add a new and
potentially time-consuming client base to defense counsel’s already overloaded plate? Of course, this client base consists of former clients, and, in
some cases, the belated nature of the newly discovered evidence pointing to
their innocence may be counsel’s fault. But is it reasonable to expect that
prior counsel—blameworthy or not—has the resources and ability to
navigate the thicket of federal filing deadlines, exhaustion requirements,
and other procedural bars imposed by AEDPA?159 And while it is possible
that defense counsel can fulfill her obligations under the Standard through
more limited actions, there are cases in which a great deal of effort will be
required. For example, perhaps counsel believes she can discharge her
duties under the Innocence Standard by calling the prosecutor and relaying
the information. But what if the prosecutor responds by demanding further
proof before taking action? A defense attorney who truly believes in a
former client’s innocence or wrongful conviction may feel compelled,
under the Innocence Standard, to interview witnesses, draft pleadings, and
take other significant actions because the stakes are so high and there is no
one else to do it. Thus, even a single step can commit counsel to the long

157

See generally Bibas, supra note 147.
See Ron Nixon, Public Defenders Are Tightening Belts Because of Steep Federal
Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/24/us/publicdefenders-are-tightening-belts-because-of-steep-federal-budget-cuts.html?_r=0;
Press
Release, The Constitution Project, Federal Criminal Justice Act Budget Cuts (July 16, 2013),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Fed-Indigent-DefenseBudget-Cuts-Highlights-7-16-13.pdf. In 2004, the authors of Gideon’s Broken Promise
chose to focus on the state systems because “the federal indigent defense system . . . is
considerably better funded and supported.” GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 144, at
51 n.6. Now that may be less true. See Ted Robbins, Cutting Public Defenders Can Cost
Federal Government More, NPR (Aug. 24, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2013/08/24/214997
385/sequestration-is-costly-in-public-defenders-offices (reporting that the Federal Public
Defender’s Office in Tucson, Arizona lost twenty-five percent of its staff as a result of the
sequester).
159
See DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(c).
158
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mile of re-investigation and re-litigation.160
These expectations may be unreasonable for defense counsel who are
overworked and under-resourced.161 So what changes can be made to the
Innocence Standard to make its overarching goal of exonerating the
wrongfully convicted more likely to succeed? This question, and other
proposed reforms to the Innocence Standard, are addressed in Part IV.
IV. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE INNOCENCE STANDARD
In light of the legal, ethical, and practical concerns identified above, I
propose specific changes to the text of the Innocence Standard and suggest
that Standard drafters include commentary that explains how defense
counsel can fulfill her obligations. The commentary must also state clearly
that it is not unethical to not take all of the steps called for by the Standard
if doing so would interfere with counsel’s primary obligation to zealously
represent her current clients. Interference could occur if the “duty to act” on
behalf of a former client would violate counsel’s duty of confidentiality to a
current client. Interference could also occur if the action called for,
particularly in the context of advising the former client of federal filing
deadlines and other AEDPA-related issues, would be so labor intensive as
to make it impossible for already overburdened counsel to provide adequate
representation to current clients. To address the latter problem, I propose
that the ABA develop a robust online training program and sample
materials that defense counsel can access and adapt to the particular facts
160
Id. at § 4–9.4(b). While the Standard also states that prior counsel can discharge the
obligation “to act” by informing current counsel (if any) to the evidence, that option often
will not exist, as the language of the Standard acknowledges. Id. at § 4–9.4(a). Most postconviction defendants do not have counsel to represent them after the conclusion of their
direct appeal. See cases cited supra note 25.
161
See, e.g., Tina Peng, Op-Ed., I’m a Public Defender. It’s Impossible for Me to Do a
Good Job Representing My Clients, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/our-public-defender-system-isnt-just-broken--its-unconstitutional/
2015/09/03/aadf2b6c-519b-11e5-9812-92d5948a40f8_story.html. Peng writes that: “The
American Bar Association recommends that public defenders not work on more than 150
felony cases a year. In 2014, I handled double that.” Id. Peng goes on to say:

An unconstitutionally high caseload means that I often see my new clients only once in those
two months. It means that I miss filing important motions, that I am unable to properly prepare
for every trial, that I have serious conversations about plea bargains with my clients in open
court because I did not spend enough time conducting confidential visits with them in jail. I
plead some of my clients to felony convictions on the day I meet them. If I don’t follow up to
make sure clients are released when they should be, they can sit in jail for unnecessary weeks
and months.

Id.
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and circumstances of her case.
A. MODIFICATIONS TO THE LANGUAGE OF THE INNOCENCE
STANDARD

In this section, I propose edits to the Innocence Standard. The first part
of the Standard states that defense counsel “has” some duty to act when she
becomes aware of material and credible evidence suggesting that a former
client was wrongfully convicted. I would replace “has some duty to act”162
with “may have some duty to act,” to make it clear that counsel is not per se
unethical if she does not act for justifiable reasons. The Standard should be
amended to make clear that the duty of confidentiality always trumps the
duty to act.
The Standard should also explicitly define the terms “credible” and
“material” so that counsel has some guidance when applying these
modifiers to the newly discovered evidence. Adopting the definition of
material used by the Supreme Court in the context of the prosecutor’s
disclosure obligations under the Brady v. Maryland line of cases seems
most appropriate.163 Under that definition, evidence is material for purposes
of mandatory disclosure “if ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.’”164 Credible equates to believable,165 but believable to
whom? It is important not to have credibility filtered through the lens of
counsel’s already-formed opinions about an old case. Therefore, the
Standard should define credible as worthy of belief when viewed from an
objective factfinder’s perspective.
In my revision, the first paragraph of the Standard would read as
follows, with the revisions in italics:

162

DEFENSE STANDARDS, supra note 17, § 4–9.4(a) (emphasis added).
373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Supreme Court did not expressly define “material” in Brady
v. Maryland. Id. at 87 (stating that a due process violation occurs where the prosecution
suppresses evidence “material either to guilt or to punishment,” but not defining the word
“material”); see also Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The
Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 646 (2002) (“[I]t is a little surprising
to find that while the adjective ‘material’ is used to describe the evidence which is covered
by the new right [from the holding in Brady], no definition of what constitutes ‘material’ is
given.”)
164
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 694 (1984)).
165
See, e.g., Credible, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (“capable of
being credited or believed”).
163
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(a) When defense counsel becomes aware of credible and material evidence or law
creating a reasonable likelihood that a client or former client was wrongfully
convicted or sentenced or was actually innocent, counsel may have some duty to act.
Credible evidence is evidence that an objective factfinder would find worthy of belief.
Material evidence is evidence that creates a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. This duty may apply even after counsel’s representation is ended. Counsel
must consider, and act in accordance with, duties of confidentiality. The duty to act
does not apply to former counsel if acting would require counsel to reveal privileged
or confidential information. In that instance, defense counsel’s conduct is governed
by Conflict of Interest Standard 4-1.7.

B. PROPOSED COMMENTARY

In this section, I suggest language for the commentary to the
Innocence Standard, which has yet to be written. The commentary should
squarely address the remaining ethical issues the Standard puts into play:
the possibility that disclosure could result in allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and the likelihood that attorneys will lack the
knowledge to advise former clients about the complexities of complying
with federal habeas corpus filing deadlines under AEDPA. The
commentary should clearly state that it is the obligation of state and federal
governments to properly fund the training and hiring of additional lawyers
necessary for indigent defense organizations to carry out the Standard’s
obligations.
With respect to the ineffective assistance of counsel issue, it is
appropriate for the commentary to advise state bar commissions to provide
disciplinary immunity in cases in which defense counsel’s duty to act on
behalf of a former client also reveals her own failures of advocacy in the
first instance. It would be counter-productive to punish defense counsel for
falling on her sword to help a former client. Providing immunity will
encourage more defense counsel to act on behalf of former clients, thus
furthering the purpose of the Standard.
There is no cure for the reputational injury that defense counsel will
suffer if a court makes a finding of ineffectiveness. Still, eliminating the
threat of suspension or disbarment will ensure that defense counsel can
continue to practice law. And even if the finding is only a reprimand, it
prevents defense counsel from sustaining yet another reputational blow. My
proposed commentary to address this issue reads as follows:
If the material and credible evidence or law tending to show actual innocence of a
client or former client, or the unlawfulness of such former client’s conviction or
sentence, was not previously discovered as the result of the fault or partial fault of
former counsel, former counsel should reveal that fact in the course of the action he or
she takes. Any potential disciplinary authority, including the state bar or any court
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having any involvement in the matter, should be aware of former counsel’s prompt
disclosure and should immunize former counsel from discipline. Other remedial
measures should also be considered, such as removing counsel’s name and identifying
information from public documents associated with the case.

Another proposed aspect of the commentary would squarely address
the Standard’s imperative that prior counsel determine all applicable
deadlines involving the use of the newly discovered evidence, including
federal filing deadlines, to ensure that the client’s rights are preserved. As
explained in Part I.C, this undertaking is complicated and labor-intensive.
The commentary should, therefore, enumerate the applicable deadlines
under AEDPA and explain how to calculate the correct date that the statute
of limitations expires through providing one simple example. The
commentary should explain how, acting pro se, the client can: (1) file a
shell petition to meet the deadline that includes the claims that have already
been decided by the state courts as well as the unexhausted
innocence/wrongful conviction claim; (2) seek a stay-and-abey order from
the federal court to exhaust the newly discovered claim of
innocence/wrongful conviction in the state court; and (3) write a motion
seeking the appointment of counsel.
Competently explaining each of these steps to a former client requires
that counsel familiarize herself with the law governing these issues. As
explained in Part I.C, most criminal defense attorneys, particularly state
court practitioners, will have no familiarity with AEDPA and will require
training and other assistance in getting up to speed.166 The American Bar
Association should play an active role in counsel’s continuing legal
education in this area by providing publicly accessible webinars that discuss
the law of federal habeas corpus and also provide training in translating this
dense doctrine into language that pro se former clients can grasp. Crucial to
this task is providing defense counsel with sample materials, which she can
adapt to the specific facts of her former client’s case. The materials should
include an advisory letter to the former client, a sample shell petition, a
sample stay-and-abey motion, and a sample motion to appoint counsel. The
American Bar Association is particularly well-suited to the task of
providing this training and these materials. Furthermore, doing so is entirely
consistent with the ABA Division of Government and Public Sector
Lawyers’ mission, which is to “[s]erve as a national leader in rededicating
adherence—within our profession and within all the Nation’s justice
166
See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 454 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[F]ew
lawyers, let alone unrepresented state prisoners, will readily understand [the complexities of
the Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence].”).
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systems—to the highest standards of professional conduct and competence,
fairness, social justice, diligence and civility.”167
By proposing these revisions and additions, I do not mean to suggest
that the issues raised by the creation of an Innocence Standard for defense
attorneys will cease to exist. I remain troubled by the specter of parity and
by the potential for counsel’s primary obligation—zealously defending her
current client—to be burdened or diluted by a new obligation that reinstates
a former attorney–client relationship. Troubling, too, is the hard reality that
state and federal governments fund indigent defense services with great
reluctance. Asking for additional monies may well result in a flat denial, so
that defense counsel is confronted with a new obligation but no means to
carry it out. It is incumbent upon the ABA to provide nationwide training
for these lawyers and to forcefully advocate for additional resources.
On the other hand, the Innocence Standard has the potential to play an
important role in ensuring that our criminal justice system does not put
innocent people in prison. It also bears emphasizing that the Defense
Function Standards promulgated by the American Bar Association are
aspirational, not mandatory. The ABA is clearly right to insist that defense
attorneys do their part to end wrongful convictions. Because the Standard
encourages and inspires them to do so, it is a noteworthy and potentially
positive development in the cannon of defense ethics.
CONCLUSION
The very existence of the American Bar Association’s new Innocence
Standard symbolizes the distance traveled by the legal profession in
recognizing and responding to the terrible problem of wrongful convictions
in the United States. But the Standard does not speak to the broader
implications of its imperative. The forthright, simple language suggests that
there is nothing controversial or even contradictory about the imposition of
an affirmative duty to act upon a trial attorney after the representation is
ended. Yet it is both of these things. As written, the Innocence Standard
suggests that defense counsel has an obligation to seek the truth when that
is not and can never be her role. The absence of immunity or favorable
treatment for former counsel who are at fault for the belated discovery of
the new evidence will inhibit some from coming forward. And without the
development of resources such as draft letters, pleadings, and CLE
167
Mission Statement, GOV’T & PUB. SECTOR LAW. DIVISION, AM. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/government_public/about_us/mission.html (last visited
Oct. 19, 2015).
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trainings, counsel staggering under the weight of excessive caseloads
simply will not be able to comply, no matter how good their intentions. The
modifications and targeted commentary proposed in this Article are
intended to make the Innocence Standard a better fit—ethically and
practically—with defense counsel’s all-important role in the criminal
justice system. The better the fit, the greater the likelihood of compliance
by the defense bar and the achievement of the ultimate goal: freeing the
wrongly convicted.

